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On the Consistency of Libertarian Claims¤
1 Introduction
If one social state is unanimously preferred to another, it is diﬃcult to argue that the
former state should not be socially chosen over the latter and, as a result, the claim that
the collective choice rule we are interested in should be Pareto-inclusive has seldom been
challenged. It may also be claimed that there are certain matters which are purely per-
sonal and our collective choice rule should be so designed that each person is empowered
to decide what should be socially chosen, no matter what others may think, in choices
over his personal matters. Sen [8] has shown that these two principles conﬂict, namely,
there exists no Pareto-inclusive collective choice rule (with an unrestricted applicability)
satisfying a mild libertarian claim.
Since the logical correctness of Sen’s argument is beyond any doubt, we are forced
to weaken either the Pareto rule or the libertarian claim in order to avoid this diﬃculty,
unless we renounce the general applicability of our collective choice procedure. Although
many subsequent contributions have modiﬁed libertarian claims in favour of the Pareto
rule, one of the lessons Sen [8 and 9] has drawn from his Paradox of a Paretian Liberal is
that a mechanical use of the Pareto rule (irrespective of the motivation behind people’s
preferences) seems unsound. In line with this observation, Sen [10, Section XI] has re-
cently proposed a resolution of this paradox which restricts the use of the Pareto rule. We
will succinctly reconstruct his resolution with some clariﬁcations of the structure of his
rights-assignment (in Section 2) and then show (in Section 3) that one of the Gibbard’s
paradoxes [4, Section 3] can be solved by essentially the same line of argument. This
might be of some importance, because Sen’s paradox and that of Gibbard are essentially
diﬀerent in nature. Suﬃce it to quote a passage from Gibbard [4, p.394]: “[Sen’s liber-
tarianism] guarantees each person a special voice on only one pair of alternatives, but
the special voice is a strong one: the alternative he prefers is to be preferable, no matter
¤First published in Review of Economic Studies, Vol.45, 1978, pp.329-342. A ﬂaw in the original
proof of Theorem 1 was rectiﬁed in “A Correction,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol.46, 1979, p.743.
We are indebted to Professors A. K. Sen and J. Wise for their comments and discussions on early draft
of this work. Thanks are also due to the Editor, Professor Peter Hammond, and the anonymous referees
of Review of Economic Studies. We retain sole responsibility for remaining opaqueness and errors, if
any.
1what his other preferences. [Gibbard’s libertarianism] guarantees each person a special
voice on many pairs of alternatives ... but the voice is limited. The one he prefers is to
be preferable if indeed he prefers its distinguishing feature unconditionally; otherwise his
preference may be overridden.”
In Section 4, we will examine the possibility of introducing information on interper-
sonal welfare comparisons into the conceptual framework. It will be shown that, if the
rights-exercising is restricted by the Rawlsian maximin justice consideration (which is
now available to us by the stronger informational basis we are working on), the modiﬁed
libertarian claim is made compatible with the Pareto principle. This is in sharp contrast
with Sen’s [10, p.228] assertion that “for this class of impossibility results, introducing
interpersonal comparisons is not much of a cure (in contrast with the impossibility results
of the Arrow type)”, which he has drawn from Kelly [6] Impossibility of a Just Liberal.
In Section 5, we will brieﬂy summarize our conclusions. Some basic concepts and
lemmas are put forward in the Appendix at the end of the chapter.
2 A Resolution of Sen’s Paradox
2.1. Let X be the set of all conceivable social states, and N a set of n individuals,
each of whom has a preference ordering Ri on X, together forming a proﬁle of individual
preference orderings. We say that i 2 N weakly prefers x to y iﬀ (x;y) 2 Ri. The strict
preference relation corresponding to Ri will be denoted by P(Ri) : (x;y) 2 P(Ri) iﬀ
[(x;y) 2 Ri & (y;x) = 2 Ri]
K stands for the set of all non-empty ﬁnite subsets of X. (An intended interpretation is
that each and every S 2 K is the set of available states.) A collective choice rule (CCR)
is a method of choosing, for each proﬁle, a social choice function (SCF) on K. Given a
proﬁle (R1;R2;:::;Rn), a CCR F amalgamates this into an SCF:
C = F(R1;R2;:::;Rn) (1)
Given an S 2 K, C(S) represents the set of socially chosen states from S when the proﬁle
(R1;R2;:::;Rn) prevails. We want our CCR to be generally applicable and Pareto-
inclusive:
Condition U (Unrestricted Domain). The domain of CCR consists of all logically
possible proﬁles of individual preference orderings.
Condition P (Pareto Rule). For all x;y 2 X;(x;y) 2 \i2NP(Ri) implies
[x 2 S & y 2 C(S)]
for no S 2 K.
Our third requirement is that our CCR should respect some personal liberty. Letting
Ω be the set of all non-empty subsets of X £X and denoting by Ω(n) the n-fold product
of Ω, the requirement in question is put as follows:
2Condition SL (Sen’s Libertarian Claim).1 There exists a symmetric
D = (D1;D2;:::;Dn) 2 Ω(n)
such that, for each i 2 N, Di contains at least one non-diagonal member and that:
(x;y) 2 Di \ P(Ri) ) [x 2 S & y 2 C(S)] for no S 2 K: (2)
Di is meant to be the set of all protected personal pairs of the individual i and
it will be referred to as i’s protected sphere. D = (D1;D2;:::;Dn) will be called a
rights-assignment. Using these terms the condition (2) may be interpreted that the
individual i can get his way in choices over his protected sphere irrespective of what
others may think. We say that the rights-assignment D = (D1;D2;:::;Dn) is symmetric
if (x;y) 2 Di , (y;x) 2 Di for all i = 1;2;:::;n. In this case, if i is allowed to impose
his preference for x against y, he can also impose his will for y against x.
Taken in isolation, these requirements seem to be rather reasonable. A disturbing
fact is that, given Condition U, Condition P and Condition SL cannot simultaneously
be satisﬁed by any CCR. It is this Paradox of a Paretian Liberal established by Sen [9,
pp.81-82 and 10, Theorem 7] which necessitates a closer examination of Condition P and
Condition SL.
2.2. Let us begin with the Condition SL. Our ﬁrst task is to introduce the concept of
coherent rights-assignment, which goes as follows.
Let D = (D1;D2;:::;Dn) be an n-tuple of subsets of X £ X. A critical loop in D
is a sequence of ordered pairs f(x¹;y¹)gt
¹=1 (t ¸ 2) such that (i) (x¹;y¹) 2 [n
i=1Di for
all ¹ = 1;2;:::;t, and (ii) there exists no i¤ 2 f1;2;:::;ng such that (x¹;y¹) 2 Di¤ for
all ¹ = 1;2;:::;t, and (iii) x1 = yt and x¹ = y¹¡1 for all ¹ = 2;:::;t.2 We say that
D = (D1;D2;:::;Dn) is coherent iﬀ there exists no critical loop in D.
From the analytical viewpoint, the importance of the concept of coherence in our
present context stems from the following basic lemma, the proof of which will be given
in the Appendix.
Lemma 1. D = (D1;D2;:::;Dn) is coherent iﬀ, for every n-tuple of orderings,
(R1;R2;:::;Rn);
there exists an order-extension R of each and every Di \ Ri (i = 1;2;:::;n):
It was Farrell [3] and Gibbard [4] who have shown that (i) if the rights-assignment D
is not coherent, Condition U and Condition SL conﬂict by themselves (without invoking
Condition P), and that (ii) if D is coherent, Condition U and Condition SL are compat-
ible. It follows that we should restrict Condition SL by requiring D to be coherent if
1Sen’s condition of minimal liberalism is still weaker than this. In his formulation, Di may be empty
for at most n ¡ 2 individuals. See Sen [9, p.87].
2The concept of the critical loop is due to Farrell [3].
3we wish to make it compatible with Condition U and some version of the Pareto rule.
Furthermore an existential statement of Condition SL, though ideal for an impossibility
exercise, is ill-suited for our present purpose. The doctored version of Condition SL we
are going to work with is as follows.
Condition CL (Coherent Libertarian Claim)
For any coherent rights-assignment D = (D1;D2::::;Dn) 2 Ω(n), (2) holds for each
i 2 N.
2.3. Turn to Condition P. Let (R1;R2;:::;Rn) be any given proﬁle and let R¤
i be a
transitive subrelation of Ri which individual i wants to count in collective decision. Thus
(x;y) 2 P(Ri) means that i prefers x to y personally, while (x;y) 2 P(R¤
i) means that
he wants his preference for x over y to count in social choice. The basic idea here is that
“the guarantee of a minimal amount of personal liberty may require that certain parts
of individual rankings should not count in some speciﬁc social choices, and in some cases
even the persons in question may agree with this” (Sen [10, pp.237-238]). Armed with
this important distinction, we now introduce a version of the conditional (strong) Pareto
rule.
Condition CP (Conditional Pareto Rule). Let R¤ = \i2NR¤
i. For all x;y 2 X,
(a) (x;y) 2 R¤ ) [x 2 S n C(S) & y 2 C(S)] for no S 2 K, and
(b) (x;y) 2 P(R¤) ) [x 2 S & y 2 C(S)] for no S 2 K.
The eﬃcacy of Condition CP as a resolvent of Sen’s paradox depends squarely on
the extent that (R¤
1;R¤
2;:::;R¤
n) is restrictive vis-` a-vis (R1;R2;:::;Rn). For example, if
R¤
i = Ri for all i 2 N, then the paradox clearly remains intact. If R¤
i = ; for all i 2 N,
however, Condition CP becomes vacuous and the paradox is “resolved”. The problem
really is to formalize a “reasonable” way of restricting Ri into R¤
i so as to avoid Sen’s
diﬃculty. Sen’s [10, Section XI] proposal to this eﬀect is now to be recapitulated. Let
D = (D1;D2;:::;Dn) 2 Ω(n)
be any coherent rights-assignment and let (R1;R2;:::;Rn) be any given proﬁle. Thanks
to our Lemma 1 given above, we then have an ordering R which subsumes each and every
individual preference over respective protected spheres. There may well be multiple order-
extensions, so that let R stand for the set of all such orderings. Let an individual j 2 N
be called a liberal iﬀ
R
¤
j = Rj \ R for some R 2 R: (3)
Namely an individual j is liberal iﬀ he claims only those parts of his preferences to count
which are compatible with others’ preferences over their respective protected spheres.
Some remarks on this basic concept might be in order. Firstly it should be emphasized
that a liberal never drops his preferences over his own protected sphere, so that a liberal
need not die a martyr for his faith in liberalism. Secondly a liberal need not really
4care very much how the order extension R is constructed from Q = [i2N(Ri \ Di). An
“active” liberal would hold a clear idea of that part of his preference ordering which he
wants to count in the collective decision. (Obviously he needs lots of information as to
the structure of rights-assignment and the wishes of individuals.) A “passive” liberal,
on the other hand, does not know his R¤
i; instead, he knows only his Ri and that he
knows he wants to be liberal. A well-informed umpire then comes in, who constructs an
order-extension R of Q and thereby constrains the preference ordering of an individual
who is wishing to be liberal. Our concept of a liberal admits both species.3
2.4. Now the theorem.
Theorem 1 (Sen [10, Theorem 9]). If there exists at least one liberal individual, a
rational CCR which satisﬁes U, CL and CP exists.
Proof. Let N1 stand for the set of all liberal individuals. By assumption, N1 is a
non-empty subset of N. Let D = (D1;D2;:::;Dn) be a given coherent rights-assignment
and let (R1;R2;:::;Rn) be a given proﬁle. Letting R be the set of all order-extensions
of Q = [i2N(Ri \ Di), we deﬁne:
R¤
i =
(
Ri \ Ri for some Ri 2 R if i 2 N1
Ri otherwise:
Denoting R¤ = \i2NR¤
i and P = \i2N1P(Ri) we deﬁne:
R0 = f(x;y) 2 X £ X : (y;x) = 2 P [ P(R
¤)g: (4)
Let us establish that R0 is complete. Suppose that there are x and y in X such that
(x;y) = 2 R0 and (y;x) = 2 R0, so that we have (x;y) 2 P [ P(R¤) and (y;x) 2 P [ P(R¤).
There are four possible cases to consider:
(i) (x;y) 2 P & (y;x) 2 P,
(ii) (x;y) 2 P(R¤) & (y;x) 2 P(R¤),
(iii) (x;y) 2 P & (y;x) 2 P(R¤),
and
(iv) (x;y) 2 P(R¤) & (y;x) 2 P.
The case (i) and the case (ii) contradict, respectively, the asymmetry of P and that of
P(R¤). Take any i0 2 N1. Then we have P ½ P(Ri0) and P(R¤) ½ R¤
i0 ½ Ri0, so that
the case (iii) and the case (iv) contradict the fact that Ri0 is an ordering. Therefore R0
must be complete.
Next we establish that:
P(R0) = P [ P(R
¤): (5)
If (x;y) 2 P(R0), then (y;x) = 2 R0, which implies (x;y) 2 P [ P(R¤) by deﬁnition.
Therefore P(R0) ½ P [ P(R¤). To show the converse, suppose there exists an ordered
3Thanks are due to Peter Hammond for his comment on this point.
5pair (x;y) such that (x;y) 2 P [ P(R¤) but (x;y) = 2 P(R0). But this contradicts the
completeness of R0 established above. Therefore (5) must be true.
Our next task is to establish the acyclicity of R0. If there exists a fx1;x2;:::;xtg 2 K
such that (x¹;x¹+1) 2 P(R0) (¹ = 1;2;:::;t ¡ 1) and (xt;x1) 2 P(R0), we have a
contradiction with the transitivity of Ri (i 2 N1) or that of R¤ thanks to the fact that
P(R¤) ½ Ri (i 2 N1). This contradiction establishes the acyclicity of R0. Now that R0
is complete and acyclic,
C(S) = G(S;R0)
for all S 2 K is a well-deﬁned rational choice function by virtue of Lemma 2¤ in the
Appendix. Associating this C with the given proﬁle (R1;R2;:::;Rn) we obtain a rational
CCR.
What remains to be shown is that this CCR satisﬁes CP and CL.
In order to show that it satisﬁes CP(a), suppose that there exist x and y such that
(x;y) 2 R¤, x 2 SnC(S) and y 2 C(S) for some S 2 K. We will bring out a contradiction
by showing that (x;z) 2 R0 for all z 2 S. Take therefore any z 2 S. Since y 2 C(S), we
have (z;y) = 2 P [ P(R¤), so that (z;y) = 2 P and [(z;y) = 2 R¤ or (y;z) 2 R¤]. Thanks to
the deﬁnition of P, we have (z;y) = 2 P iﬀ (y;z) 2 Ri for some i 2 N1. By assumption we
have (x;y) 2 R¤ so that we obtain (x;y) 2 R¤
i ½ Ri for this i 2 N1. Ri being transitive,
(x;y) 2 Ri and (y;z) 2 Ri yield (x;z) 2 Ri. It then follows that (z;x) = 2 P(Ri), which
implies that:
(z;x) = 2 P: (6)
Suppose now that (z;y) = 2 R¤, which implies (z;y) = 2 R¤
i for some i 2 N. If i 2
N n N1, then we have (y;z) 2 P(Ri). As (x;y) 2 Ri follows from (x;y) 2 R¤, we
obtain (x;z) 2 P(Ri), namely, (z;x) = 2 Ri. Therefore (z;x) = 2 R¤. If i 2 N1, then
[(z;y) = 2 Ri or (z;y) = 2 Ri], namely, [(y;z) 2 P(Ri) or (y;z) 2 P(Ri)] holds true, which
implies (x;z) 2 P(Ri)[P(Ri) in view of (x;y) 2 R¤. Therefore we again obtain (z;x) = 2
R¤. Consider the case where (y;z) 2 R¤. Coupled with (x;y) 2 R¤ this implies that
(x;z) 2 R¤, hence (z;x) = 2 P(R¤). Therefore in every conceivable case we obtain that:
(z;x) = 2 P(R
¤): (7)
It follows from (6) and (7) that (z;x) = 2 P [P(R¤), so that we have arrived at (x;z) 2 R0
as desired. The proof of CP(a) is thereby complete. Next CP(b). If there are x and y
satisfying (x;y) 2 P(R¤), x 2 S and y 2 C(S) for some S 2 K, we have (y;x) 2 R0
entailing (x;y) = 2 P [ P(R¤). But this contradicts (x;y) 2 P(R¤).
Finally we show that our CCR satisﬁes the Condition CL. Suppose to the contrary
that there are an i 2 N and S 2 K satisfying (x;y) 2 Di \ P(Ri), x 2 S and y 2 C(S).
Then we obtain (y;x) 2 R0 entailing (x;y) = 2 P [ P(R¤). By deﬁnition of R, we have
P(Q) ½ \i2N1P(Ri) = P, so that if we can show
Di \ P(Ri) ½ P(Q); (8)
we are home. (Because, then we have (x;y) 2 Di \ P(Ri) ½ P, in contradiction with
(x;y) = 2 P [ P(R¤).) To show (8), let (w;z) 2 Di \ P(Ri). Clearly (w;z) 2 Q, so that
6if (w;z) = 2 P(Q) then (z;w) 2 Q = [i2NQi. Then there exists a j 2 N (j 6= i) such that
(z;w) 2 Dj \ Rj. If follows that D contains a critical loop, a contradiction. k
The gist of this resolution is very simple and intuitive. The Pareto principle is enforced
only by unanimous agreement. Its use can therefore be vetoed by any one person and a
liberal may well serve as a vetoer. Notice that a liberal is, by deﬁnition, one who always
(for every proﬁle) exercises the veto in favour of every expressed protected right, and of
every consequence of all of these, and of further arbitrary additions.
2.5. It might help if we exemplify how this resolution works.
Example 1 (Lady Chatterley’s Case, Sen [9, pp.80-81]). There is a single copy of Lady
Chatterley’s Lover. The set of social states consists of three alternatives: Mr A (the
prude) reading it, (x), Mr B (the lascivious) reading it, (y), and no one reading it (z).
Mr A prefers z most, next x (wishing thereby to take the hurt on himself) and lastly y (for
fear of the possible misbehaviour of Mr B), while Mr B prefers x most (in order to educate
the reactionary Mr A), y next and lastly z. Therefore RA = ∆ [ f(z;x);(x;y);(z;y)g
and RB = ∆[f(x;y);(y;z);(x;z)g, where ∆ denotes the diagonal binary relation on the
space in question. (In our present context, ∆ = f(x;x);(y;y);(z;z)g.) The protected
sphere of Mr A is DA = f(x;z);(z;x)g and that of Mr B is DB = f(y;z);(z;y)g. (Notice
that this rights-assignment D = (DA;DB) is coherent.) No Pareto-inclusive CCR can
realize this rights-assignment, however.
In this case QA = RA \ DA = f(z;x)g and QB = RB \ DB = f(y;z)g, so that
Q = f(z;x);(y;z)g. The order-extension of this Q is unique:
R = ∆ [ f(y;z);(z;x);(y;x)g:
Suppose that Mr A is liberal while Mr B is not, so that R¤
A = R \ RA = ∆ [ f(z;x)g
and R¤
B = RB, entailing R¤ = ∆. By deﬁnition we then have
R0 = ∆ [ f(y;z);(z;x);(y;x)g;
so that G(fx;y;zg;R0) = fyg. Therefore our suggested solution for the Lady Chatterley’s
Case is: Give that copy to the lascivious. k
A few remarks might be in order here. Firstly, in line with the statement of Sen’s liber-
tarian claim (SL), we supposed that DA and DB were symmetric in the Lady Chatterley’s
Case. Sen’s paradox still works, however, even if DA = f(z;x)g and DB = f(y;z)g. It is
easy to verify that our resolution given above still applies without any change. Secondly,
our solution to the Lady Chatterley’s Case does not hinge on our supposing that it is
Mr A who is liberal. Mr B being liberal leads us to the same solution. Is this a general
feature of our solution procedure? To show that it is not, we put forward the following:
Example 2 (Two Meddlers Case, Blau [2]). There are two individuals, Mr A and Mr B,
and four distinct alternatives x;y;z and w. The rights-assignment is DA = f(x;y);(y;x)g
7and DB = f(z;w);(w;z)g. Mr A prefers w to x to y to z, while Mr B prefers y to z
to w to x. Mr A is meddlesome in that his preference over his protected pair is weaker
(in the ordinal intensity sense) than his opposition to the other’s preference over that
individual’s protected pair. Mr B is also a meddler in this sense. In this case the
unadulterated exercise of rights, coupled with the mechanical use of the Pareto rule,
brings us into the impasse of social indecision.
Let us see how our solution procedure will fare in coping with this situation. It is
easy to see that, in this Two Meddlers Case, Q = f(x;y);(z;w)g. There are multiple
order-extensions of this Q, thirteen altogether, from which we pick out
R® = ∆ [ f(x;y);(x;z);(x;w);(y;z);(y;w);(z;w)g,
R¯ = ∆ [ f(z;w);(z;x);(z;y);(w;x);(w;y);(x;y)g, and
R° = ∆ [ f(x;z);(z;x);(x;y);(x;w);(z;y);(z;w);(y;w)g.
Depending on who is liberal and which order-extension is to be used, there are diﬀerent
solution schemes. Let the scheme where Mr A is liberal with the order-extension R® be
denoted by (A;®). It is easy, if tedious, to verify that the solution in the scheme (A;®)
is fxg, that in the scheme (B;¯) is fzg, and that in the scheme (fA;Bg;°) is fx;zg. k
3 A Resolution of Gibbard’s Paradox
3.1. We start with an observation that the Condition SL and the Condition CL share
two important peculiarities. Firstly the rights-assignment in SL as well as that in CL is
independent in the sense that, whenever (x;y) 2 Di and i strictly prefers x to y, he can
get his way whatever his preference over X n fx;yg happens to be. Secondly, apart from
our interpretation, there is nothing in the formal statement of SL and CL which assures
us that, whenever (x;y) 2 Di, the diﬀerence between x and y is i’s purely personal
concern. Gibbard’s [4] libertarian claim diﬀers from SL and CL in these respects and, as
a result, a paradox he arrived at is essentially diﬀerent from that of Sen. We will show
in this section that this diﬀerent paradox can nevertheless be resolved along the similar
line of reasoning as we used above.
3.2. The social state is now construed as a list of impersonal and personal features of
the world. Let X0 be the set of all impersonal features and Xi the set of all personal
features of individual i 2 N. X, the set of all social states, is now represented as
X = X0 £ X1 £ ::: £ Xn:
We assume that X0 and Xi (i 2 N) are ﬁnite with at least two elements each. Our
notational convention is that, for each i 2 N and each x = (x0;x1;:::;xn) 2 X,
X)i( = X0 £ X1 £ ::: £ Xi¡1 £ Xi+1 £ ::: £ Xn
8and x)i( = (x0;x1;:::;xi¡1;xi+1;:::;xn). Furthermore, if xi 2 Xi and
z = (z0;z1;:::;zi¡1;zi+1;:::;zn) 2 X)i(;(xi;z) = (z0;z1;:::;zi¡1;xi;zi+1;:::;zn):
Finally we deﬁne D0
i by:
D
0
i = f(x;y) 2 X £ X : x)i( = y)i(g (i 2 N):
Therefore if (x;y) 2 D0
i, then x and y can possibly diﬀer only in the speciﬁcation of i’s
personal feature.
3.3. Now Gibbard’s [4, p.393] version of a libertarian claim.
Condition GL (Gibbard’s Libertarian Claim). For each i 2 N, if (x;y) 2 D0
i and
((xi;z);(yi;z)) 2 P(Ri) for all z 2 X)i(, then [x 2 S & y 2 C(S)] for no S 2 K.
In words, it is required that, if x and y diﬀer only in i’s personal feature and if i
prefers xi unconditionally to yi, then his personal choice should be socially respected.
Gibbard [4, Theorem 2] has shown that there exists no CCR satisfying U, GL and P.
Notice that D0 = (D0
1;D0
2;:::;D0
n) 2 Ω(n) is not independent and it is not coherent by
construction.
3.4. As a ﬁrst step in resolving Gibbard’s dilemma, we show that a binary relation Q0
deﬁned by
Q
0
i = f(x;y) 2 D
0
i : ((xi;z);(yi;z)) 2 P(Ri) for all z 2 X)i(g (i 2 N)
and
Q
0 = [i2NQ
0
i
is consistent for any proﬁle (R1;R2;:::;Rn). Suppose to the contrary that there exists
a fx1;x2;:::;xtg 2 K such that (x1;x2) 2 P(Q0);(x¹;x¹+1) 2 Q0 for all ¹ = 2;:::;t ¡ 1
and (xt;x1) 2 Q0. Then there exists an i 2 N such that
(x
1;x
2) 2 D
0
i (9)
and
((x
1
i;z);(x
2
i;z)) 2 P(Ri) for all z 2 X)i(: (10)
Corresponding to the sequence fx¹gt
¹=1 deﬁne a sequence fx¹
¤gt
¹=1 by
x
¹
¤ = (x
¹
i ;x
1
)i(); (¹ = 1;2;:::;t): (11)
By virtue of Gibbard’s lemma [4, p.396] we then have (x¹
¤;x¹+1
¤ ) 2 Ri (¹ = 2;:::;t ¡ 1)
and (xt
¤;x1
¤) 2 Ri, while (10) entails that (x1
¤;x2
¤) 2 P(Ri). But this contradicts the
transitivity of Ri. Now that Q0 is consistent, there exists an ordering R0 subsuming Q0
9by virtue of Lemma 1¤ in the Appendix. Let R0 be the set of all order-extensions of Q0.
Call an individual j 2 N a G-liberal iﬀ
R
¤
j = Rj \ R
0 for some R
0 2 R
0: (12)
In words j is G-liberal iﬀ he claims only those parts of his preferences to count which
are compatible with others’ unconditional preferences over their personal variations. Our
remarks on the nature of a liberal individual presented in 2.3. also apply to a G-liberal
individual as well.
Now the following theorem is true.
Theorem 2. If there exists at least one G-liberal individual, a rational CCR satisfying
U, GL and CP exists.
A slight modiﬁcation of the proof of Theorem 1 (replying R by R0) establishes The-
orem 2, the detail of which may safely be skipped.
3.5. Let us analyse an example and contrast our solution with that of Gibbard [4].
Example 3 (Wall Colour Case, Gibbard [4, pp.394-395]). There are two individuals,
Mr A and Mr B, and four alternative states, all of which are identical with respect to
the impersonal features of the world. They diﬀer only in the colour of their respective
bedroom walls. Let these alternative states be (w;w);(y;w);(w;y) and (y;y), dropping
for the sake of simplicity the coordinate of impersonal features. (The ﬁrst coordinate
designates the colour of Mr A’s walls and the second that of Mr B’s, w and y standing
respectively for white and yellow.) In this case,
D
0
A = f((w;w);(y;w));((y;w);(w;w));((w;y);(y;y));((y;y);(w;y))g
and
D
0
B = f((y;y);(y;w));((y;w);(y;y));((w;y);(w;w));((w;w);(w;y))g:
It is cleat that D0 = (D0
A;D0
B) is not coherent. Suppose that their preferences are such
that:
RA : (w;w);(y;w);(w;y);(y;y)
and
RB : (y;y);(y;w);(w;y);(w;w):
Namely Mr A prefers w to y unconditionally and that he wants Mr B to choose as he
does. Mr B in turn prefers y to w unconditionally and he wants Mr A to choose as
he does. In this case, the rights-exercising of Mr A and Mr B, coupled with the na¨ ıve
use of the Pareto rule, kicks out all alternatives from social choice and no CCR can be
satisfactory if we stick to U, GL and P.
10Now our solution procedure. Corresponding to the given proﬁle (RA;RB), we have
Q0
A = f((w;w);(y;w));((w;y);(y;y))g and Q0
B = f((y;y);(y;w));((w;y);(w;w))g. An
order-extension R0 of Q0
A [ Q0
B is then given by:4
R
0 : (w;y);(y;y);(w;w);(y;w):
Suppose that Mr A is G-liberal while Mr B is not, so that
R
¤
A = R
0 \ RA = ∆ [ f((w;y);(y;y));((w;w);(y;w))g
and R¤
B = RB, yielding R¤ = ∆. We then have
R0 = ∆ [ f((w;y);(y;y));((w;y);(w;w));((w;y);(y;w)),
((y;y);(w;w));((y;y);(y;w));(w;w);(y;w))g,
so that G(f(w;w);(y;w);(w;y);(y;y)g;R0) = f(w;y)g. Therefore our solution is: Let
people choose whatever colour they unconditionally prefer. (Our conclusion remains
intact if Mr B is G-liberal and Mr A is not.) k
Gibbard’s [4, Section 4] way-out of his paradox is to make his libertarian claim alien-
able and goes typically as follows. Although Mr A prefers (w;w) to (y;w), and could
avoid (y;w) by exercising his right to (w;w) over (y;w), Mr B claims his right to (w;y)
over (w;w), and Mr A prefers (y;w) to (w;y). By exercising his right to avoid (y;w), Mr
A ends up with what he likes no better, so that, Gibbard argues, his right to (w;w) over
(y;w) is waived. By the same token Mr B’s right to (y;y) over (y;w) is waived. Following
this reasoning we arrive at the conclusion that Gibbard’s suggested social choice out of
f(w;w);(y;w);(w;y);(y;y)g
is (y;w). It seems to us that this is a suggestion which is rather hard to swallow.
Why on earth should people be assigned the colour of their bedroom walls which they
unconditionally dislike?5
We have thus shown that restricting the use of the Pareto rule is a workable way-
out of Gibbard’s paradox and that, in some cases at least, it provides us with a more
“reasonable” solution than Gibbard’s resolution via the alienability of rights.
4There are two other order-extensions of Q0
A [ Q0
B, namely:
R0® : (w;y);(w;w);(y;y);(y;w)
R0¯ : (w;y);[(w;w);(y;y)];(y;w).
(In R0¯,(w;w) and (y;y) are deemed to be indiﬀerent, so that they are put together by square brackets.)
Nothing will be changed even if we use R0® or R0¯ instead of R0 in the rest of our argument: (w;y) will
still be chosen.
5It is true that our way of solving the paradox ignores what Gibbard [4] has called “a strong libertarian
tradition of free contract”, according to which “a person’s rights are his own to use or bargain away as
he sees ﬁt” [4, p.397]. This argument does not seem to deprive our resolution of its reasonableness in
the present example, however.
114 Justice and Liberty: Interpersonal Welfare Com-
parisons
4.1. Back now to Sen’s paradox in Section 2. The problem at hand is to ﬁnd a way around
the diﬃculty by making use of information on the interpersonal welfare comparisons.
More explicitly we make use of the information available from “extended sympathy”
(Arrow [1, p.114]), in the form of placing oneself in the position of another. In the
literature there are assertions that this additional information does not provide us with
a way-out of Sen’s dilemma (Kelly [6] and Sen [10]). We will show, however, that if the
rights-exercising is restricted by the maximin justice consideration along the line of Rawls
[7] and Sen [9, Chapter 9], the constrained libertarian claim is made compatible with the
Pareto rule, so that (as in the case of Arrovian impossibility theorems) the possibility of
the interpersonal welfare comparisons does help us in circumventing Sen’s paradox.
4.2. Interpersonal comparisons of the extended sympathy type are of the form: it is
better to be an individual i in state x than to be an individual j in state y. This
is formally put by an ordering ˜ R (to be called an extended ordering) on X £ N with
(x;i) 2 X £N standing for being in the position of individual i in social state x. We will
work exclusively with the extended orderings satisfying Sen’s axiom of complete identity
(Sen [9, p.156]) in the sense that we assume that all individuals in the society share
identical extended orderings. Needless to say this still allows each and every individual
to have full freedom in judging social states placing himself in his own shoes, so that if
we deﬁne
Ri = f(x;y) 2 X £ X : ((x;i);(y;i)) 2 ˜ Rg (i 2 N); (13)
each Ri is an ordering on X and (R1;R2;:::;Rn) is a proﬁle (in the sense of Section 2)
on which no restriction is placed. We are now concerned with a generalized collective
choice rule (GCCR) which is a method of choosing, for each extended ordering, an SCF
on K:6
C = Ψ( ˜ R): (14)
The requirement of general applicability of our GCCR reads as follows.
Condition GU (Unrestricted Domain). The domain of GCCR consists of all logically
possible extended orderings.
Notice that we can reinterpret Condition P, Condition SL and Condition CL as re-
quirements on GCCR with the understanding that Ri there now stands for (13).
4.3. Let Σ be the set of all one-to-one correspondences between N and N. Given an
extended ordering ˜ R, the maximin relation of justice M( ˜ R) and the Suppes’ relation of
justice J( ˜ R) [11] are deﬁned respectively by
6This is a functional CCR analogue of what Hammond [5] called the generalized social welfare func-
tion.
12(x;y) 2 M( ˜ R) , 9k 2 N : [8i 2 N : ((x;i);(y;k)) 2 ˜ R] (15)
(x;y) 2 J( ˜ R) , 9± 2 Σ :
8
> <
> :
8j 2 N : ((x;j);(y;±(j))) 2 ˜ R
& (16)
9k 2 N : ((x;k);(y;±(k))) 2 P( ˜ R):
In words, x is more just than y in the maximin sense iﬀ it is no worse to be anyone
in state x than to be some speciﬁed individual in state y, while x is more just than y in
Suppes’ sense iﬀ there exists a one-to-one transformation of N into itself such that (a)
being in state x in someone’s position is better than being in state y in the position of
the corresponding individual and (b) being in the position of each individual in x is no
worse than being the corresponding individual in y. It is known that, for each ˜ R, M( ˜ R),
is an ordering on X (Sen [9, Theorem 9¤4]) and J( ˜ R) is an asymmetric and transitive
relation on X (Sen [9, Theorem 9¤1]). Furthermore the following inclusions are true for
each ˜ R:
\i2NP(Ri) ½ J( ˜ R) ½ M( ˜ R); (17)
where Ri is deﬁned by (13).
4.4. Consider now the following requirement on GCCR.
Condition SJ (Suppes’ Justice Rule). For all x;y 2 X if (x;y) 2 J( ˜ R), then
[x 2 S & y 2 C(S)]
for no S 2 K.
A little reﬂection convinces us that there is no hope for our obtaining a GCCR
satisfying GU, SJ and SL. (Suﬃce it to notice that Condition SJ implies Condition P by
virtue of (17) and Condition GU implies Condition U (trivially rephrased as a condition
on GCCR), while Sen’s liberal paradox tells us that U,P and SL conﬂict.) Kelly [6,
Theorem 3] has strengthened this observation in that even if we weaken SL so that (2)
is constrained in such a way that
(x;y) 2 Di \ P(Ri) & (y;x) = 2 J( ˜ R) ) [x 2 S & y 2 C(S)] for no S 2 K (18)
we still cannot break the impasse. This is what he called the Impossibility of a Just
Liberal.
4.5. The libertarian claim we are going to work with is a constrained version of the
previous Condition CL.
Condition ML (Maximin Libertarian Claim). For any coherent rights-assignment
D = (D1;D2;:::;Dn) 2 Ω(n),
(x;y) 2 Di \ P(Ri) & (y;x) = 2 M( ˜ R) ) [x 2 S & y 2 C(S)] for no S 2 K (19)
13holds for each i 2 N.
In words, an individual i can get his way for x against y if (x;y) is his protected
pair and y is not more just than x in the maximin sense. Therefore rights-exercising is
restricted in ML by the maximin justice consideration.
The following theorem is true, which clearly contrasts with Kelly’s impossibility the-
orem.
Theorem 3. There exists a rational GCCR satisfying GU, ML and SJ.
Before proving this proposition, we refer to a simple corollary thereof.
Corollary. There exists a rational GCCR satisfying GU, ML and P.
The message of this proposition is clear: The possibility of the interpersonal welfare
comparisons does help us in ﬁnding a way around Sen’s impossibility theorem as it helped
us in avoiding Arrow’s impossibility theorem. Kelly’s and Sen’s contrary statement is due
to their insuﬃcient use of the information which is actually available from the extended
sympathy.
4.6. Proof of Theorem 3. Let ˜ R be any given extended ordering and let Ri (i 2 N) be
deﬁned by (13). Ri being an ordering for all i 2 N, there exists an order-extension R of
Q = [i2N(Ri \ Di) as in 2.2. Let ˜ R be the set of all such orderings. Take an R 2 ˜ R
(which is ﬁxed once and for all) and let R0 be deﬁned by
R0 = f(x;y) 2 X £ X : (y;x) = 2 J( ˜ R) [ [P(R) \ P(M( ˜ R))]g: (20)
We show that this R0 is complete. Suppose to the contrary that (x;y) = 2 R0 and (y;x) = 2
R0 for some x and y in X. By deﬁnition we then have four cases to consider:
(i) (x;y);(y;x) 2 J( ˜ R),
(ii) (x;y);(y;x) 2 P(R) \ P(M( ˜ R)),
(iii) (x;y) 2 J( ˜ R) & (x;y) = 2 P(R) \ P(M( ˜ R)) &(y;x) = 2 J( ˜ R)
& (y;x) 2 P(R) \ P(M( ˜ R))
and
(iv) (x;y) = 2 J( ˜ R) & (x;y) 2 P(R) \ P(M( ˜ R)) & (y;x) 2 J( ˜ R)
& (y;x) = 2 P(R) \ P(M( ˜ R)).
The case (i) and the case (ii) contradict, respectively, the asymmetry of J( ˜ R) and that of
P(R). The case (iii) cannot occur because (x;y) 2 J( ˜ R) and (17) imply (x;y) 2 M( ˜ R),
14while (y;x) 2 P(M( ˜ R)) iﬀ (y;x) 2 M( ˜ R) & (x;y) = 2 M( ˜ R). Similarly the case (iv) leads
us to a contradiction. Therefore R0 is complete. Next we show that
P(R0) = J( ˜ R) [ [P(R) \ P(M ˜ R)]: (21)
If (x;y) 2 P(R0), then (y;x) = 2 J( ˜ R) [ [P(R) \ P(M( ˜ R))] and
(x;y) 2 J( ˜ R) [ [P(R) \ P(M( ˜ R))]
by deﬁnition, so that we have P(R0) ½ J( ˜ R) [ [P(R) \ P(M( ˜ R))]. On the other hand,
if there are x and y in X such that (x;y) 2 J( ˜ R) [ [P(R) \ P(M( ˜ R))] and that (x;y) = 2
P(R0), a contradiction with the completeness of R0 ensues. Therefore (21) is true.
Thirdly, we show the acyclicity of R0. Suppose to the contrary that there exists a
fx1;x2;:::;xtg 2 K such that (x¹;x¹+1) 2 P(R0) (¹ = 1;2;:::;t ¡ 1) and (xt;x1) 2
P(R0). Noticing (17) and (21) this leads us to a contradiction either with the transitivity
of J( ˜ R) or with that of M( ˜ R).
Now that R0 is complete and acyclic, C(S) = G(S;R0) for all S 2 K is a well-deﬁned
rational choice function on K. Associating this C with the given ˜ R, we obtain a rational
GCCR. To show that this GCCR satisﬁes Condition SJ, suppose that there exist x and
y in X such that (x;y) 2 J( ˜ R) and [x 2 S & y 2 C(S)] for some S 2 K. We then have
(x;y) = 2 J(R) [ [P(R) \ P(M( ˜ R))]
thanks to the construction of C, in contradiction with (x;y) 2 J( ˜ R). Thus Condition SJ
is satisﬁed. Condition ML is also satisﬁed. To see this, suppose that there are x and y in
X and i 2 N such that (x;y) 2 Di \ P(Ri);(y;x) = 2 M( ˜ R) and [x 2 S & y 2 C(S)] for
some S 2 K. We then have (x;y) = 2 J( ˜ R) [ [P(R) \ P(M( ˜ R))]. On the other hand, we
have (x;y) 2 Di\P(Ri) ½ P(Q) ½ P(R), while (y;x) = 2 M( ˜ R) implies (x;y) 2 P(M( ˜ R)).
Therefore we obtain (x;y) 2 P(R)\P(M( ˜ R)), a contradiction. This completes our proof.
k
4.7. The simplest possible case which is of interest is provided by the following:
Example 4 (Two Meddlers Case with Extended Sympathy). This is the same as the
Example 2 save for the fact that Mr B, alas, is physically handicapped and it is commonly
reckoned that Mr B’s welfare is lower in whatever social state than that of Mr A in any
social state. Mr A should realize, then, that by exercising his holy right the worse-oﬀ
Mr B would become worst-oﬀ of all and, as a socially conscious creature, Mr A might
refrain from exercising his right. Put formally, we may assume in this example that
˜ R : (w;A);(x;A);(y;A);(z;A);(y;B);(z;B);(w;B);(x;B):
It follows therefore that
M( ˜ R) = ∆ [ f(y;x);(w;x);(z;x);(y;w);(z;w);(y;z)g
15and
J( ˜ R) = f(w;x);(y;z)g:
Let S = fx;y;z;wg. Thanks to the Pareto rule we have x = 2 C(S) and z = 2 C(S). We
also have w = 2 C(S) because (z;w) 2 DB \ P(RB) and (w;z) = 2 M( ˜ R). Although we
have (x;y) 2 DA \ P(RA), his right for x against y is waived because (y;x) 2 M( ˜ R). It
follows that the social choice from S is determinate and we have C(S) = fyg. k
This example poses an interesting problem concerning the use of information in resolv-
ing social conﬂict. Recall that our resolution of the Two Meddlers Case in the Example 2
under the scheme (A;®) was fxg. It follows that if the interpersonal welfare comparison
is possible but it is not made use of in resolving the conﬂict in question, the outcome
might well be the worst possible one relative to the extended sympathy ordering! We
may suggest that failure to make eﬃcient use of available information could be extremely
costly.
4.8. It should be clear that Gibbard’s paradox can similarly be resolved along the
same line of argument if we are armed with the stronger informational basis allowing
interpersonal welfare comparisons.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have shown that if either certain parts of individual preferences are
refrained from being counted in social choice (thereby constraining the applicability of
the Pareto rule) or the individual’s rights-exercising is constrained by the maximin jus-
tice considerations, a minimal amount of personal liberty in a Paretian society may be
guaranteed. As a conclusion we may suggest that one of the prerequisites for a liberal
Paretian society is to develop individual attitudes which respect and care for each other’s
liberty and well-being. From a slightly diﬀerent angle, we may put the general implica-
tion of our analysis as follows. Just as we needed stronger informational basis (than what
is compatible with the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom) in circumventing
Arrow’s impossibility theorem, it is necessary to look beyond the set of individual pref-
erence orderings and to secure stronger informational basis for collective decision if we
wish to be successful in reconciling the libertarian claim with the Paretian ethics.
Appendix
1. Let X be the set of all alternatives and let K denote the set of all non-empty ﬁnite
subsets of X. A binary relation R is a subset of X £ X. The asymmetric component of
R is deﬁned by
P(R) = f(x;y) : (x;y) 2 R & (y;x) = 2 Rg:
R is said to be
16(a) complete iﬀ (x;y) 2 R or (y;x) 2 R for all x and y in X,
(b) acyclic iﬀ there exists no fx1;x2::::;xtg 2 K such that (x¹;x¹+1) 2 P(R) for all
¹ = 1;2;:::;t ¡ 1 and (xt;x1) 2 P(R),
(c) consistent iﬀ there exists no fx1;x2 :::;xtg 2 K such that
(x1;x2) 2 P(R);(x¹;x¹+1) 2 R
for all ¹ = 2;:::;t ¡ 1 and (xt;x1) 2 R,
(d) transitive iﬀ (x;y) 2 R and (y;z) 2 R imply (x;z) 2 R for all x;y and z in X,
(e) asymmetric iﬀ R = P(R), and
(f) an ordering iﬀ it is complete and transitive.
Some clarifying comments on the concept of consistency might be in order. As is
easily veriﬁed, the transitivity of R implies the consistency thereof, while the consistency
of R implies its acyclicity. In each case, the converse is not true in general. In order to
see this, let R1 and R2 be deﬁned on X = fx;y;zg by
R
1 = f(x;y);(y;z);(z;y)g
and
R
2 = f(x;y);(y;z);(z;y);(x;z);(z;x)g:
Then R1 is consistent but not transitive, while R2 is acyclic but not consistent. The
diﬀerence between transitivity and consistency disappears, however, if R happens to be
complete. To verify this, suppose that R is complete but not transitive. Then there exist
x;y and z such that (x;y) 2 R, (y;z) 2 R and (x;z) = 2 R. R being complete, we then
have (z;x) 2 P(R), (x;y) 2 R and (y;z) 2 R, so that R is not consistent. Therefore a
complete R is consistent iﬀ it is transitive.
2. It might help if we give an alternative formulation for acyclicity and consistency. For
any two binary relations R1 and R2 on X we deﬁne the composition of R1 and R2 by
R
1R
2 = f(x;y) : (x;z) 2 R
1 & (z;y) 2 R
2 for some z 2 Xg:
Given a binary relation R we deﬁne a sequence fR(n)g1
n=1 of binary relations by
R
(1) = R;R
(n) = RR
(n¡1) (n ¸ 2):
The transitive closure of R is then deﬁned by
T(R) = [
1
n=1R
(n):
In these terms R is acyclic iﬀ T(P(R)) \ ∆ = ;, while R is consistent iﬀ
P(R)T(R) \ ∆ = ;;
where ∆ is the diagonal binary relation on X. Noticing that T(P(R)) ½ P(R)T(R) it
immediately follows that a consistent relation is acyclic.
3. Let R1 and R2 be two binary relations. We say that R2 is an extension of R1 iﬀ (i)
R1 ½ R2, and (ii) P(R1) ½ P(R2). In this case we also say that R1 is a subrelation of R2.
17If R2 is an extension of R1 and that R2 is an ordering, we say that R2 is an order-extension
of R1. In view of the subtle diﬀerence between transitivity and consistency, it seems quite
intuitive that the following extension theorem is true, although it is non-trivial in its full
generality.
Lemma 1¤ (Suzumura [13, Theorem 3]). A binary relation R has an order-extension
iﬀ R consistent.
This proposition generalizes Szpilrajn’s basic theorem to the eﬀect that every quasi-
ordering has an order-extension.7 It should be noticed that there may well exist multiple
order-extensions of a given consistent binary relation.
4. Let R be any binary relation on X. For any S 2 K, the set of all R-greatest points of
S is deﬁned by:
G(S;R) = fx : x 2 S & (x;y) 2 R for all y 2 Sg:
The following neat result is important.
Lemma 2¤ (Sen [9, Lemma 1¤l]). G(S;R) is non-empty for all S 2 K iﬀ R is
complete and acyclic.
5. A choice function C on K maps any S 2 K into a non-empty subset C(S) of S. Thanks
to Lemma 2¤, a complete and acyclic binary relation R generates a choice function C on
K deﬁned by
C(S) = G(S;R) for all S 2 K: (1¤)
Conversely a choice function C on K is said to be rational iﬀ there exists a binary relation
R satisfying (1¤). In this case R is called a rationalization of C. A rational choice function
whose rationalization is an ordering is said to be full-rational. See Suzumura [12 & 14]
for the characterization of rational and full-rational choice functions.
6. Just as we deﬁned in the above the composition of binary relations, we may deﬁne
the composition of protected spheres, which enables us to present a less loaded deﬁnition
of the coherent rights-assignment. Namely the rights-assignment D = (D1;D2;:::;Dn)
is coherent iﬀ
(x;x) = 2 Di1Di2 :::Dik for all x 2 X
for every non-constant sequence fi1;i2;:::;ikg with i¹ 2 N (¹ = 1;2;:::;k).
7. Finally we prove our basic Lemma 1.
7See Szpilrajn [15]. As a matter of fact Szpilrajn was concerned with partial orderings (rather than
quasi-orderings) but the proposition referred to is a simple corollary of his theorem. See also Arrow [1,
p.64].
18Proof of Lemma 1. Let D = (D1;D2::::;Dn) be coherent and take any n-tuple
(R1;R2;:::;Rn) of orderings. Deﬁne Q by
Qi = Di \ Ri (i = 1;2;:::;n) and Q = [n
i=1Qi. (2¤)
We show that Q is a consistent binary relation. Suppose to the contrary that there exists
fx1;x2;:::;xtg 2 K such that (x1;x2) 2 P(Q);(x¹;x¹+1) 2 Q for all ¹ = 2;:::;t¡1 and
(xt;x1) 2 Q. By deﬁnition, (x1;x2) 2 P(Q) iﬀ (x1;x2) 2 Qi for some i, and (x2;x1) = 2 Qi
for all i, so that we have (x1;x2) 2 P(Qi) for some i. Therefore there exists an i¹ for
each ¹ = 1;2;:::;t such that (x1;x2) 2 P(Qi1);(x¹;x¹+1) 2 Qi¹ (¹ = 2;:::;t ¡ 1) and
(x
t;x
1) 2 Qit:
It follows that (i) fi1;i2;:::;itg is not a singleton set, and (ii)
(x
¹;x
¹+1) 2 Di¹ (¹ = 1;2;;:::;t ¡ 1)
and (xt;x1) 2 Dit. Therefore D contains a critical loop, a contradiction. Now that Q
turns out to be consistent, there exists an order-extension R of Q by virtue of our Lemma
1¤. By construction we have Qi ½ Q ½ R and P(Q) ½ P(R). If we can show that
P(Qi) ½ P(Q);
we are home. Suppose therefore that there exists (x;y) 2 P(Qi) such that (y;x) 2 Qi0
for some i0. But D then contains a critical loop, a contradiction.
To prove the converse, suppose to the contrary that D is not coherent. Then we have
a critical loop in D:(x1;x2) 2 Di1, (x2;x3) 2 Di2;:::;(xt;x1) 2 Dit. Let (R1;R2;:::;Rn)
be an n-tuple of orderings satisfying:
(x1;x2) 2 P(Qi1);(x2;x3) 2 Qi2;:::;(xt;x1) 2 Qit: (3¤)
Since fi1;i2;:::;itg cannot be a singleton set, there is no contradiction in supposing (3¤).
Let R be an order-extension of Qi (i = 1;2;:::;n). Then (3¤) implies that
(x
1;x
2) 2 P(R);(x
2;x
3) 2 R;:::;(x
t;x
1) 2 R;
in contradiction with the transitivity of R. This completes the proof. k
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20Chapter 14
Liberal Paradox and the Voluntary
Exchange of Rights-Exercising¤
1 Introduction
Among many recent contributions on the logical (in)compatibility of the Paretian ethics
and the libertarian claims, initiated by Sen’s [11, Chapter 6¤] theorem on the impos-
sibility of a Paretian liberal, Gibbard’s [3] analysis, which culminates in the ediﬁce of
the alienable rights system, deserves particular scrutiny. It tries, among other things,
to call due attention to “a strong libertarian tradition of free contract,” according to
which “a person’s rights are his to use or bargain away as he sees ﬁt.”1 Searching ex-
aminations of the Gibbard’s system have already been put forward by Karni [7], Kelly
[8; 9, Chapter 9], Sen [12, Sect. IV] and Suzumura [14], but it seems to us that there
remain many important points to be made on this interesting contribution. The purpose
of this chapter is to point out that Gibbard’s system of alienable rights in a revised
version proposed by Kelly [8; 9 Chapter 9] represents a standard for individual liberty
which cannot be met by any universal collective choice rule. That is to say, it is logically
impossible to construct a collective choice rule with unrestricted domain, which realizes
the Gibbard-Kelly system of alienable rights. This clearly contradicts Kelly’s assertion
to the eﬀect that “[the revision] causes no signiﬁcant changes in the theorems that make
up Gibbard’s libertarian claim.”2 This is unfortunate, since Kelly’s revision seems to be
rather persuasive. To the extent that Kelly’s proposed revision is acceptable, therefore,
the workability and reasonableness of Gibbard’s scheme seem to be in serious doubt. At
the very least, the ediﬁce of the alienable rights system should be evaluated with this
subtlety in mind. In passing, we will examine the possibility and limitation of resolving
¤First published in Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.22, 1980, pp.407-422. Reprinted in C. K. Rowley,
ed., The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, Vol.27, Social Justice and Classical
Liberal Goals, Cheltenham, Glos.: Edward Elgar, 1993, pp.483-498. I am grateful to Professors Kiyoshi
Kuga and Jerry S. Kelly, whose incisive comments on Suzumura [14] led me to reexamine Gibbard’s
system of alienable rights. Thanks are also due to an anonymous referee of Journal of Economic Theory
for his/her helpful suggestions.
1Gibbard [3, p.397]. See also Barry [1, p.166].
2Kelly [8 ,p.144; 9, p.148].
21the liberal paradox via the metarational exercising of rights a la Howard [4-6] in view of
the similarity between the prisoners’ dilemma and the Paretian liberal paradox, which
was pointed out by Fine [2].
2 Gibbard’s Consistent Libertarian Claim and Kelly’s
Revision Thereof
2.1. Let N = f1;2;:::;ng denote the ﬁnite set of individuals (n ¸ 2) and let X stand for
the set of all conceivable social states. What we call a social state is a list of impersonal
and personal features of the world. Letting X0 and Xi stand respectively for the set of
all impersonal features of the world and the set of all personal features of the individual
i 2 N, the set of all social states, X, is now given by X = X0 £(Πi2NXi). It is assumed
that X0 and Xi are ﬁnite with at least two elements each. Ri denotes a weak preference
(at least as good as) relation of the individual i 2 N. We assume that Ri is an ordering
on X, being complete [for all x and y;(x;y) 2 Ri and/or (y;x) 2 Ri] and transitive
[for all x;y and z;(x;y) 2 Ri and (y;z) 2 Ri imply (x;z) 2 Ri]. The strict preference
relation P(Ri) is deﬁned as usual by (x;y) 2 P(Ri) , [(x;y) 2 Ri & (y;x) = 2 Ri]. The
indiﬀerence relation I(Ri) is deﬁned by (x;y) 2 I(Ri) , [(x;y) 2 Ri & (y;x) 2 Ri].
A list R = (R1;R2;:::;Rn) of individual weak preference orderings will be called a
proﬁle. A collective choice rule (CCR) is a function F which represents a method of
amalgamating each proﬁle R = (R1;R2;:::;Rn) into a social choice function C on the
family S of all ﬁnite nonempty subsets of X : C = F(R). When an S 2 S is speciﬁed
as a set of realizable states, C(S) denotes the nonempty set of socially chosen states.
In what follows, we will be concerned with constructing a CCR which may amalgamate
every logically possible proﬁles.
Condition U (Unrestricted domain). The domain of our CCR consists of all logically
possible proﬁles.
2.2. As a matter of notational convention, we let X)i( = X0 £ X1 £ ::: £ Xi¡1 £
Xi+1 £ ::: £ Xn and, for each i 2 N and each x = (x0;x1;:::;xn) 2 X, x)i( =
(x0;x1;:::;xi¡1;xi+1;:::;xn). Furthermore, if xi 2 Xi and z = (z0;z1;:::;zi¡1;zi+1;:::;zn)
2 X)i(, then (xi;z) = (z0;z1;:::;zi¡1;xi;zi+1;:::;zn). We deﬁne Di by
Di = f(x;y) 2 X £ Xjx)i( = y)i(g (i 2 N):
Therefore if (x;y) 2 Di, x and y may possibly diﬀer only in the speciﬁcation of i’s personal
feature. Call D = (D1;D2;:::;Dn) the Gibbardian rights system or the decomposable
rights system.
2.3. The CCR should also be so designed, a naive libertarian might claim, that it
endows the special say to the ith individual over each and every pair (x;y) 2 Di in the
following sense:
22Condition GL(1) (Gibbard’s ﬁrst libertarian claim). For every proﬁle R = (R1;R2;:::;
Rn), every i 2 N, and every x;y 2 X, if (x;y) 2 Di \ P(Ri), then [x 2 S ) y = 2 C(S)]
for all S 2 S, where C = F(R).
An unfortunate fact is that there exists no CCR which satisﬁes this naive libertar-
ian claim together with Condition U. This is Gibbard’s ﬁrst impossibility theorem [3,
Theorem 1] on the libertarianism.
2.4. It is now time we formulate two versions of the Pareto rule.
Condition EP (Exclusion Pareto). For every proﬁle R = (R1;R2;:::;Rn) and every
x;y 2 X, if (x;y) 2 \i2NP(Ri), then [x 2 S ) y = 2 C(S)] for all S 2 S, where C = F(R).
Condition IP (Inclusion Pareto). For every proﬁle R = (R1;R2;:::;Rn) and every
x;y 2 X, if (x;y) 2 \i2NP(Ri), then [fx 2 S & y 2 C(S)g ) x 2 C(S)] for all S 2 S,
where C = F(R).
Let x and y be such that everyone in the society strictly prefers x to y. Then Condition
EP requires that the CCR prohibit y from being chosen from every environment where
x is available, while Condition IP requires that the CCR be such that x is chosen from
every environment where x is available and y is chosen. Clearly EP, which is a quite
common formulation of the Pareto rule, is a stronger requirement on CCR than IP.3
2.5. Turn now to Gibbard’s second libertarian claim, which goes as follows.
Condition GL(2) (Gibbard’s second libertarian claim). For every proﬁle R = (R1;R2;
:::;Rn), every S 2 S, every i 2 N, and every x;y 2 X, if (x;y) 2 Di \ P(Ri) and
((xi;z)i();(yi;z)i()) 2 P(Ri) for all z)i( such that (xi;z)i();(yi;z)i() 2 S, then [x 2 S )
y = 2 C(S)], where C = F(R).
In Condition GL(1), it is required that the CCR allow each and every individual to
exercise his right (x;y) 2 Di whenever he happens to prefer x to y. In contrast, Condition
GL(2) does not necessarily allow the de facto individual preferences to rule the roost: It is
required in GL(2) that the CCR protect the right (x;y) 2 Di only when the ith individual
prefers the distinguishing feature xi of x unconditionally to the corresponding feature yi
of y. Clearly GL(2) represents a milder libertarian claim than GL(1). Nevertheless, there
exists no CCR which satisﬁes GL(2), EP, and U. This is Gibbard’s second impossibility
3It might be of some interest to present a concrete CCR which satisﬁes the Condition IP but does
not satisfy the Condition EP. The simplest example is a rule which assigns to each and every proﬁle
R = (R1;R2;:::;Rn) a choice function C such that C(S) = S for all S 2 S. An intrinsically more
interesting example is the majority closure method (Sen [13, pp. 56, 74]). Let MR be the simple majority
relation corresponding to a given proﬁle R. Take any S 2 S and let T(MR j S) be the transitive closure
of MR on S. A choice set C¤
R(S) represents a subset of S consisting of the T(MR j S)-greatest points in
S. The majority closure method is a CCR which assigns to each R the choice function C¤
R. It is easy to
see that this CCR satisﬁes IP but not EP.
23theorem [3, Theorem 2] on the libertarianism. A slight generalization thereof is the
following:
Theorem 1. There exists no CCR which satisﬁes GL(2), IP and U.
Proof. Suppose that there exists such a CCR. Take any a0 2 X0 and ai 2 Xi (i 2
Nnf1;2g) and ﬁx them for the rest of this proof. Take xi;x0
i 2 Xi;xi 6= x0
i, where i = 1;2
and deﬁne
x1 = (a0;x1;x2;a3;:::;an),
x2 = (a0;x1;x0
2;a3;:::;an),
x3 = (a0;x0
1;x2;a3;:::;an),
and
x4 = (a0;x0
1;x0
2;a3;:::;an).
Let S = fx1;x2;x3;x4g 2 S and let a proﬁle R = (R1;R2;:::;Rn) be such that
R1(S) : x1;x3;x2;x4,
R2(S) : x4;x3;x2;x1,
and, for all i 2 Nnf1;2g,
Ri(fx2;x3g) : x3;x2,
where Ri(S) denotes the restriction of Ri on the set S: Ri(S) = Ri \ (S £ S).4 Clearly,
then, (x1;x3) 2 D1;(x2;x4) 2 D1 and (x2;x1) 2 D2. No other individual has right
over these states. Since individual 1 prefers x1 to x0
1 unconditionally and individual 2
prefers x0
2 to x2 unconditionally, Condition GL(2) implies that x3 = 2 C(S);x4 = 2 C(S), and
x1 = 2 C(S) for a choice set C(S) which corresponds to the speciﬁed R and S. Suppose now
x2 2 C(S). Then we have (x3;x2) 2 \i2NP(Ri);x3 2 S and x2 2 C(S), so that Condition
IP requires that x3 2 C(S), a contradiction. Therefore we must have C(S) = ;, which
negates the existence of a CCR satisfying GL(2), IP and U.
2.6. A salient common feature of GL(1) and GL(2) deserves particular mention: It is
supposed that the ith individual’s right is exercised in complete negligence of any reper-
cussion from the rest of the society, guided solely by the individual rational calculus.
From this viewpoint, the gist of the Gibbardian impossibility theorems mentioned so far
may be interpreted as the failure of the isolated rational rights-exercising. An ingenious
4Preference orderings are written horizontally with the less preferred states appearing to the right of
the more preferred states, indiﬀerent states, if any, being put together by square brackets.
24proposal crystallized in Gibbard’s third libertarian claim is to make individual’s liber-
tarian rights alienable in cases where the exercise of one’s libertarian rights brings him
into a situation he likes no better than the situation that would otherwise have been
brought about. Gibbard observes that, given an R = (R1;R2;:::;Rn) and an S 2 S, an
individual i 2 N has the will as well as the right to exclude y from C(S) if x 2 S and
(x;y) 2 Di \ P(Ri), but his right for the pair (x;y) had better be waived if there exists
a sequence fy1;y2;:::;y¸g in S such that
y¸ = x;(y;y1) 2 Ri & y 6= y1; (1)
and
(8t 2 f1;2;:::;¸ ¡ 1g): (yt;yt+1) 2 (\j2NP(Rj)) [ ([j2Nnfig[Dj \ P(Rj)]): (2)
Let us deﬁne a subset Wi(R j S) of Di, to be called the waiver set, by (x;y) 2 Wi(R j S)
iﬀ (1) and (2) are true for some sequence fy¹g¸
¹=1 in S.
Condition GL(3) (Gibbard’s third libertarian claim). For every proﬁle R = (R1;R2;:::;
Rn), every S 2 S, every i 2 N, and every x;y 2 X, if (x;y) 2 Di \ P(Ri) and
(x;y) = 2 Wi(R j S), then [x 2 S ) y = 2 C(S)], where C = F(R).
Clearly this is a claim which diﬀers essentially from GL(1) and GL(2) in that it
is explicitly recognized that an individual’s rights-exercising may induce unfavorable
responses of the others which might well nullify the beneﬁt for which the initial exercising
was intended. Gibbard has shown that GL(3) represents a Pareto-consistent libertarian
claim; i.e., there exists a CCR which satisﬁes GL(3), EP, and U.5
2.7. Kelly [8; 9, Chapter 9] claims to have found some “ﬂaws” in Gibbard’s deﬁnition
of the rights-waiving rule and proposes two revisions thereof, the ﬁrst of which goes as
follows6. Let a proﬁle R = (R1;R2;:::;Rn) and a set of realizable states S 2 S be given.
An individual i waives his right for (x;y) 2 Di, namely that (x;y) 2 W ¤
i (R j S), iﬀ there
exists a sequence fy1;y2;:::;y¸g in S satisfying
y¸ = x & (y;y1) 2 P(Ri); (3)
and (2).
Condition KL(1) (Kelly’s ﬁrst libertarian claim). For every proﬁle R = (R1;R2;:::;
Rn), every S 2 S, every i 2 N, and every x;y 2 X, if (x;y) 2 Di \ P(Ri) and (x;y) = 2
W ¤
i (R j S), then [x 2 S ) y = 2 C(S)], where C = F(R).
The only diﬀerence between GL(3) and KL(1) lies in the contrast between (1) and
(3). The reason behind this revision is that “in forcing the move from y to x by exercising
5Gibbard [3, Theorem 4].
6As a matter of fact, Kelly proposes the third revised version. For our purpose it is not necessary to
get into this complicated proposal, however.
25[(x;y) 2 Di; the individual i] does not seem to have gotten into trouble if he is forced
in the end to take a y1 where he is indiﬀerent between y1 and y. Waiving might be
appropriate for a cautious exerciser if [(y;y1) 2 P(Ri)] for some [sequence fy1;y2;:::;y¸g],
but not if only [(y;y1) 2 Ri as in (1)]” (Kelly [8, p.141; 9, pp.146-147]).
Going one step further, Kelly proposes his second revised libertarian claim. Suppose
that a proﬁle R = (R1;R2;:::;Rn) and an S 2 S are given. This time, an individual i is
supposed to waive his right for (x;y) 2 Di, namely that (x;y) 2 W ¤¤
i (R j S) iﬀ:
(a) There exists a sequence fy1;y2;:::;y¸g in S such that
y¸ = x & (y;y1) 2 P(Ri); (4)
and
(8t 2 f1;2;:::;¸ ¡ 1g): (yt;yt+1) 2 (\j2NP(Rj)) [ ([j2Nnfig[Dj \ P(Rj)]); (5)
(b) For any sequence fz1;z2;:::;z¸¤g in S such that
z¸¤ = y1 & (z1;y) 2 P(Ri); (6)
and
(8t 2 f1;2;:::;¸
¤ ¡ 1g): (zt;zt+1) 2 (\j2NP(Rj)) [ ([j2N[Dj \ P(Rj)]); (7)
there exists correspondingly a sequence fw1;w2;:::;w¸¤¤g in S such that
w¸¤¤ = z1 & (y;w1) 2 P(Ri); (8)
and
(8t 2 f1;2;:::;¸
¤¤ ¡ 1g): (wt;wt+1) 2 (\j2NP(Rj)) [ ([j2Nnfig[Dj \ P(Rj)]): (9)
Condition KL(2) (Kelly’s second libertarian claim). For every proﬁle R = (R1;R2;:::;
Rn), every S 2 S, every i 2 N, and every x;y 2 X, if (x;y) 2 Di \ P(Ri) and
(x;y) = 2 W ¤¤
i (R j S), then [x 2 S ) y = 2 C(S)], where C = F(R).
The diﬀerence between KL(1) and KL(2) is the addition of (b) in the deﬁnition of
W ¤¤
i (R j S), which says basically that any sequence fz1;z2;:::;z¸¤g which seems to repair
in the eyes of the individual i the damage caused upon him by a sequence fy1;y2;:::;y¸g
will be made ineﬀective by some other, out-of-control sequence fw1;w2;:::;w¸¤¤g.
3 Impossibility Theorems
3.1. Taken by themselves, these proposed revisions may seem to be fairly persuasive
and, according to Kelly [8, p.144; 9, p.148], “it causes no signiﬁcant changes in the
26theorems that make up Gibbard’s libertarian claim.” The truth is, however, that Kelly’s
reasonable-looking revisions to Gibbard’s libertarian claim change it into a standard for
individual liberty which cannot possibly be met, as the following impossibility theorems
show.
Theorem 2. There exists no CCR which satisﬁes KL(1) and U.
Theorem 3. There exists no CCR which satisﬁes KL(2) and U.
To prove these theorems, note ﬁrst that, for every proﬁle R = (R1;R2;:::;Rn) and
every S 2 S, the following set-inclusions are true.
W
¤¤
i (R j S) ½ W
¤
i (R j S) ½ Wi(R j S) (10)
for all i 2 N. Clearly, then, KL(2) is a stronger libertarian claim than KL(1), so that we
have only to prove Theorem 2, Theorem 3 being a corollary thereof.
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose that F is a CCR which satisﬁes KL(1) and U. Let
S = fx1;x2;x3;x4g 2 S be deﬁned as in the proof of Theorem 1 and let a proﬁle
R = (R1;R2;:::;Rn) be such that
R1(S) : x1;x4;[x2;x3];
R2(S) : x3;x2;[x1;x4]:
There is no restriction on Ri for i 2 Nnf1;2g whatsoever. It is clear that (x1;x3) 2 D1,
(x4;x2) 2 D1, (x3;x4) 2 D2 and (x2;x1) 2 D2. No other individual has right over these
pairs of states. Consider the pair of states (x1;x3) 2 D1 \ P(R1). The worst which
could happen to individual 1 after his exercise of (x1;x3) 2 D1 is the counterexercise
by 2 of (x2;x1) 2 D2 in view of (x2;x1) 2 P(R2). (Note that there is no state in S
which strictly Pareto-dominates x1.) Since x2 and x3 are indiﬀerent to individual 1 and
x2 6= x3, GL(3) would let 1 waive his right over (x1;x3), but KL(1) does allow 1 to
exercise his right over (x1;x3): (x1;x3) 2 W1(R j S)nW ¤
1(R j S). Similar reasoning
leads us to (x4;x2) 2 W1(R j S)nW ¤
1(R j S);(x3;x4) 2 W2(R j S)nW ¤
2(R j S) and
(x2;x1) 2 W2(R j S)nW ¤
2(R j S). By virtue of the Condition KL(1) it then follows that
C(S) = ;, a contradiction.
3.2. Kelly’s ﬁrst revised libertarian claim thus brings back an impossibility. A fortiori,
his second (and stronger) revised libertarian claim is inconsistent with the existence of
a universal CCR. One may thereby be tempted to conclude that the system of alienable
rights is something like a fragile glasswork which may be easily smashed to pieces while
giving the last ﬁnish to it. To be fair, however, one should not forget to examine whether
the ﬁnishing touch was an appropriate one.
Back, then, to the contrast between GL(3) and KL(1), i.e., the contrast between (1)
and (3). Stipulation (3) was recommended in place of (1), because, in forcing the move
from y to x by exercising (x;y) 2 Di, individual i does not lose anything even if he is
27forced in the end to take a y1 such that (y;y1) 2 I(Ri) and y 6= y1. Note, however,
that he does not gain anything either. Note also that the rights-exercising in Gibbard’s
system places very heavy demands on the information gathering and processing7, so that
the rights-exercising would be unwise unless it yielded a positive gain. This argument, if
accepted, would favor (1) rather than (3) and would necessitate the following modiﬁcation
of KL(2). Given a proﬁle R = (R1;R2;:::;Rn) and an S 2 S, deﬁne the waiver set
W 0
i (R j S) by (x;y) 2 W 0
i (R j S) iﬀ:
(a) There exists a sequence fy1;y2;:::;y¸g in S such that
y¸ = x;(y;y1) 2 Ri & y 6= y1; (11)
and
(8t 2 f1;2;:::;¸ ¡ 1g): (yt;yt+1) 2 (\j2NP(Rj)) [ ([j2Nnfig[Dj \ P(Rj)]); (12)
(b) For any sequence fz1;z2;:::;z¸¤g in S such that
z¸¤ = y1 & [(z1;y) 2 P(Ri) _ z1 = y] (13)
and
(8t 2 f1;2;:::;¸
¤ ¡ 1g): (zt;zt+1) 2 (\j2NP(Rj)) [ ([j2N[Dj \ P(Rj)]); (14)
there exists correspondingly a sequence fw1;w2;:::;w¸¤¤g in S such that
w¸¤¤ = z1;(y;w1) 2 Ri & y 6= w1; (15)
and
(8t 2 f1;2;:::;¸
¤¤ ¡ 1g): (wt;wt+1) 2 (\j2NP(Rj)) [ ([j2Nnfig[Dj \ P(Rj)]); (16)
for all i 2 N. Utilizing this modiﬁed deﬁnition of the waiver set, we now put forward the
following:
Condition GKL (Gibbard-Kelly libertarian claim). For every proﬁle R = (R1;R2;:::;Rn),
every S 2 S, every i 2 N, and every x;y 2 X, if (x;y) 2 Di\P(Ri) and (x;y) = 2 W 0
i (R j
S), then [x 2 S ) y = 2 C(S)], where C = F(R).
How does GKL fare in the context of universal CCRs? That it fares no better than
KL(1) and KL(2) is the thrust of the next theorem.
Theorem 4. There exists no CCR which satisﬁes GKL and U.
Proof. Suppose that F is an eligible CCR. Let S = fx1;x2;x3;x4g 2 S and R =
(R1;R2;:::;Rn) be the same as in the proof of Theorem 2. Consider now the pair of states
7Kelly [8, p.141; 9, p.146].
28(x2;x3) 2 D1 \P(R1). The worst situation which individual 1’s exercise of (x1;x3) 2 D1
may induce is the counterexercise by 2 of (x2;x1) 2 D2 in view of (x2;x1) 2 P(R2).
Individual 1 may then exercise (x4;x2) 2 D1 \P(R1) to secure x4, which 1 prefers to x3.
Is there any nullifying sequence? The worst which could happen to 1 is the exercise by
2 of (x3;x4) 2 D2, which does not require 1 to waive his right (x1;x3) 2 D1 according
to the deﬁnition of W 0
1(R j S).8 Therefore GKL ensures that x3 = 2 C(S). By the same
token we may verify that
[(x4;x2) 2 D1 \ P(R1) & (x4;x2) = 2 W 0
1(R j S)] ) x2 = 2 C(S);
[(x2;x1) 2 D2 \ P(R2) & (x2;x1) = 2 W 0
2(R j S)] ) x1 = 2 C(S);
and
[(x3;x4) 2 D2 \ P(R2) & (x3;x4) = 2 W 0
2(R j S)] ) x4 = 2 C(S),
so that we obtain C(S) = ;, a contradiction.
3.3. If we examine the proﬁle which we utilized in proving Theorems 2, 3, and 4, it
turns out that both 1 and 2 are expressing preferences which are conditional on the other’s
selection of his personal feature: 1 prefers x1 to x0
1 if 2 has x2, while he prefers x0
1 to x1
if 2’s choice is x0
2 and vice versa. Probably it is too much to ask for the existence of a
universal CCR which protects individual’s mere conditional preferences. On reﬂection, we
need only require the existence of a CCR which protects individual’s libertarian rights so
far as the relevant individual expresses unconditional preference for his personal features.
Therefore, let N(R j S) be the set of individuals having unconditional preferences, given
a proﬁle R and an available set S 2 S, i.e., i 2 N(R j S) iﬀ (x;y) 2 Di \(S £S)\P(Ri)
always implies that ((xi;z)i();(yi;z)i()) 2 P(Ri) for all z)i( such that (xi;z)i() 2 S and
(yi;z)i() 2 S. The relevant waiver set will then have to be speciﬁed thus: (x;y) 2 Di will
be waived, i.e., (x;y) 2 W 00
i (R j S) iﬀ either (i) i 2 NnN(R j S), or (ii) the following
conditions hold true:
(a) There exists a sequence fy1;y2;:::;y¸g in S such that
y¸ = x;(y;y1) 2 Ri & y 6= y1;
8Two clariﬁcations might be in order here. First, from x2, something else may happen (besides 1
exercising his right (x4;x2) 2 D1) if the Pareto-dominance relation is weakened from \i2NP(Ri) to
P(\i2NRi). That is to say, if (x3;x2) 2 Ri for all i 2 Nnf1;2g and if in (12), (14) and (16) all instances
of \i2NP(Ri) are replaced by P(\i2NRi), x3 might be picked over x2 by a Pareto-dominance. It is
clear, however, that this possibility does not aﬀect our conclusion that (x1;x3) = 2 W0
1(R j S). Second,
in arriving at the conclusion that (x1;x3) = 2 W0
1(R j S), we have followed the “path” x3 ! x1 ! x2 !
x4 ! x3 generated by the successive rights-exercising of 1 and 2. Namely, we started from x3 and came
back to x3 again! It might be asked, why don’t we let 1 waive his right (x1;x3) 2 D1 in this case?
Put diﬀerently, why do we stipulate the condition y 6= y1 in (11)? The reason is that there exists an
important diﬀerence between (i) the travel from x3 (via a sequence of states) to x3 back again, and (ii)
the travel from x3 to an x¤ 2 S such that (x3;x¤) 2 I(R1). In the former case, individual 1 comes back
to x3 without losing his right over x3, while in the latter case, 1 may well be stuck at x¤ without having
any right over x¤. This is also the reason why we modiﬁed (6) into (13).
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(8t 2 f1;2;:::;¸ ¡ 1g): (yt;yt+1) 2 (\j2NP(Rj)) [ ([j2N(RjS)nfig[Dj \ P(Rj)]);
(b) For any sequence fz1;z2;:::;z¸¤g in S such that
z¸¤ = y1 & [(z1;y) 2 P(Ri) _ z1 = y]
and
(8t 2 f1;2;:::;¸
¤ ¡ 1g): (zt;zt+1) 2 (\j2NP(Rj)) [ ([j2N(RjS)[Dj \ P(Rj)]);
there exists correspondingly a sequence fw1;w2;:::;w¸¤¤g in S such that
w¸¤¤ = z1;(y;w1) 2 Ri & y 6= w1;
and
(8t 2 f1;2;:::;¸
¤¤ ¡ 1g): (wt;wt+1) 2 (\j2NP(Rj)) [ ([j2N(RjS)nfig[Dj \ P(Rj)]);
Our ﬁnal version of the libertarian claim in the spirit of Gibbard and Kelly goes as
follows.
Condition GKL
¤. For every proﬁle R = (R1;R2::::;Rn), every S 2 S, every i 2 N,
and every x;y 2 X, if (x;y) 2 Di \ P(Ri) and (x;y) = 2 W 00
i (R j S), then [x 2 S ) y = 2
C(S)], where C = F(R).
Clearly GKL
¤ is weaker than GL(2). Unfortunately this modest version of the liber-
tarian claim still may not break the impasse if there are at least three individuals in the
society.
Theorem 5. Suppose than n ¸ 3. Then there exists no CCR which satisﬁes GKL
¤,
IP and U.
Proof. Suppose that an eligible CCR F does exist. Take any a0 2 X0 and ai 2
Xi (i 2 Nnf1;2;3g) and ﬁx them for the rest of this proof. Take xi;x0
i 2 Xi;xi 6= x0
i for
i 2 f1;2;3g and deﬁne
x0 = (a0;x1;x2;x0
3;a4;:::;an);
x1 = (a0;x1;x2;x3;a4;:::;an);
x2 = (a0;x1;x0
2;x3;a4;:::;an);
x3 = (a0;x0
1;x2;x3;a4;:::;an);
and
30x4 = (a0;x0
1;x0
2;x3;a4;:::;an):
Let S = fx0;x1;x2;x3;x4g 2 S and let a proﬁle R = (R1;R2;:::;Rn) be such that
R1(S) : x1;x3;x2;x4;x0,
R2(S) : [x3;x4];x2;x1;x0,
R3(S) : x3;x2;x0;x4;x1,
and, for all i 2 Nnf1;2;3g :
Ri(fx0;x2;x3g) : x3;x2;x0.
By deﬁnition we see that (x1;x3) 2 D1, (x2;x4) 2 D1, (x3;x4) 2 D2, (x2;x1) 2 D2
and (x0;x1) 2 D3. Note that individual 1 prefers x1 to x0
1 unconditionally, and individual
3 prefers x0
3 to x3 unconditionally. On the other hand, individual 2 prefers x0
2 to x2 if
1 chooses x1, while he is indiﬀerent between x2 and x0
2 if 1 chooses x0
1 instead. In view
of this conditional nature of 2’s preferences, his rights-exercising will be made ineﬀective
by a CCR subject to GKL
¤. Consider now the pair of states (x1;x3) 2 D1 \ P(R1).
The worst contingency which could be induced by the exercise of (x1;x3) 2 D1 is the
counterexercise of (x0;x1) 2 D3 \ P(R3). Since (x3;x0) 2 \i2NP(Ri) holds true, and
there exists no nullifying sequence in S, we may conclude from GKL¤ that
[(x
1;x
3) 2 D1 \ P(R1) & (x
1;x
3) = 2 W
00
1 (R j S)] ) x
3 = 2 C(S):
Similarly we may verify that
[(x
2;x
4) 2 D1 \ P(R1) & (x
2;x
4) = 2 W
00
1 (R j S)] ) x
4 = 2 C(S)
and
[(x
0;x
1) 2 D3 \ P(R3) & (x
0;x
1) = 2 W
00
3 (R j S)] ) x
1 = 2 C(S):
We may then invoke Condition IP (as we did in the proof of Theorem 1) to conclude
that x2 = 2 C(S) and x0 = 2 C(S). It then follows that C(S) = ;, a contradiction.
4 Metarational Exercising of Rights
4.1. Among the libertarian claims we have examined in the above, GL(3), KL(1), KL(2),
GKL and GKL¤ diﬀer substantially from GL(1) and GL(2) in that due attention is paid
in the former category of claims to the fact that, in deciding whether to exercise one’s
right or not, one should take into considerations the others’ response via their rights-
exercising and/or Pareto-dominance. Notice, however, that it is commonly assumed
in these claims that each individual, in predicting the others’ response to his rights-
exercising, presumes that the others follow the naive rights-exercising rule without making
31any eﬀort of prediction on their part.9 It might be asked, what can we make of the
libertarian claims if we assume instead the complete mutual prediction?
4.2. The situation of complete mutual prediction may be modeled after the metagame
theory of Howard [4-6]. For simplicity let there be only two individuals in the society
and let an impersonal feature vector s0 2 X0 be ﬁxed for the rest of this chapter. S1 and
S2 denote the set of all available personal feature alternatives of individual 1 and that
of individual 2, respectively. Given a proﬁle R = (R1;R2), we may construe the 4-tuple
¡ = (S1;S2;R1;R2) as a basic game played by 1 and 2. Each individual k 2 f1;2g wishes
to choose such an sk 2 Sk as to yield, coupled with the ﬁxed s0 and the choice s»k 2 S»k
of the other individual »k, a state (s0;sk;s»k) 2 fs0g £ S1 £ S2 ´ S which “optimizes”
his preference Rk over S.10 In a liberal society k obviously lacks the power to regulate
the choice by »k of his personal feature, so that the best k can do is to predict the choice
by »k and to form a metastrategy which is a function gk from S»k into Sk such that, for
each s»k 2 S»k, (s0;gk(s»k);s»k) 2 S is the best state in S with respect to Rk. In eﬀect,
then, k is thinking in terms of the ﬁrst-level metagame k¡ = (Gk;S»k;Rk;R»k), where
Gk denotes the set of all functions from S»k into Sk. In doing this, however, k should
be aware that »k may be able to, and should rationally try to, predict k’s choice of his
metastarategy. The subjective game of k in the situation of complete mutual prediction
is the second-level metagame (»k)k¡ = (Gk;F »k;Rk;R»k), where F »k denotes the set
of all functions from Gk into S»k. We repeat for emphasis: The metagame (»k)k¡
represents a model in which »k is able to predict k’s choice in the metagame k¡, while
the metagame k¡ represents a model in which k is able to predict » k’s choice in the
basic game ¡. Thus in the metagame (»k)k¡ there is complete mutual prediction.
4.3. Let us say, following Howard, that an outcome (gk
¤;f»k
¤ ) of the metagame (»
k)k¡ is metarational for k via (»k)k¡ iﬀ:
[(g
k
¤(f
»k
¤ (g
k
¤));f
»k
¤ (g
k
¤));(g
k
¤(f
»k
¤ (g
k
¤));f
»k
¤ (g
k))] 2 Rk (17)
for all gk 2 Gk. In this case the corresponding basic outcome, which is given by (s0;gk
¤(f»k
(gk
¤));f»k(gk
¤)) 2 S, will be called hereafter the metarational basic outcome for k via
(»k)k¡. Let Mk[(»k)k¡] denote the set of all metarational basic outcomes for k via
(»k)k¡. We may similarly deﬁne M»k[(»k)k¡];Mk[k(»k)¡], and M»k[k(»k)¡]. It
is now time we introduce the concept of metasolutions. In our present context, two
possibilities suggest themselves. First we have
M
¤(¡) = Mk[(»k)k¡] \ M»k[k(»k)¡]; (18)
which is appealing for the following reason. In general, “there will be a strong tendency
for player i’s subjective metagame to be one in which he follows all the others last. For
9This point was duly stressed by Kelly. He has shown that a serious diﬃculty of correctable miscal-
culation emerges from this peculiarity of the Gibbardian rights-exercising rule. See Kelly [8; 9, Chapter
9].
10It is assumed here that the set of realizable states S satisﬁes Kelly’s [8; 9, Chapter 9] agenda-
closedness and Seidl’s [10] technological separability.
32such a metagame is precisely one in which he can predict the others’ basic strategies,
they cannot predict his, and they are possibly able to predict his [metastrategy]. Indeed,
if we add the condition that i believes there is complete mutual prediction ..., then this
precisely describes the complete metagames in which he follows all others last.”11 It then
follows that, if s¤ 2 M¤(¡), then s¤ is a metarational basic outcome for both individuals
via their respective “natural” subjective metagames with complete mutual prediction.
The second metasolution concept of our concern is
M¤(¡) = fMk[(»k)k¡] \ M»k[(»k)k¡]g [ fMk[k(»k)¡] \ M»k[k(»k)¡]g: (19)
By deﬁnition, s¤ 2 M¤(¡) holds true iﬀ s¤ is a metarational basic outcome for both
individuals via a common metagame with complete mutual prediction. Remember that
an s¤ 2 M¤(¡), however “natural” it may be, cannot be an equilibrium via voluntary
bargaining or negotiation except as a result of some kind of misunderstanding: Each
individual behaves as if he can predict the other’s basic strategy while the other can at
best predict his metastrategy choice, but they cannot both be correct. In contrast, a
metasolution s¤ 2 M¤(¡) is the basic outcome which constitutes an equilibrium when
both individuals have agreed on the same subjective metagame.
4.4. We now examine these metasolution concepts in the context of the liberal para-
doxes.
Example 1. Let ¡ = (S1;S2;R1;R2) be such that S1 = fs1;s0
1g;S2 = fs2;s0
2g and
R1(S) : s1;s3;s2;s4,
R2(S) : s4;s3;s2;s1,
where s1 = (s0;s1;s2);s2 = (s0;s1;s0
2);s3 = (s0;s0
1;s2) and s4 = (s0;s0
1;s02). Note that
this proﬁle is the same as the one used in the proof of Theorem 1. In the game-theoretic
context, this situation is known as the prisoners’ dilemma.12 It is easy, if tedious, to
verify for this game ¡ that M1[21¡] = M2[21¡] = M1[12¡] = M2[12¡] = fs2;s3g, so
that we have:
M
¤(¡) = M¤(¡) = fs
2;s
3g:
Let OR(S) be the set of Pareto-optimal states in S when the proﬁle R prevails. Note,
then, that fs3g = OR(S)\M¤(¡) = OR(S)\M¤(¡). Therefore it may duly be said that
the metarational exercising of rights brings about a Pareto-optimal state in the case of
prisoners’ dilemma proﬁle, thereby resolving the Paretian liberal paradox.
An important feature of this scheme should be stressed: Each individual need not
know the other’s preference in this scheme, since Mk[(»k)k¡] as well as Mk[k(»k)¡]
are deﬁnable solely in terms of k’s own preferences. This is certainly a nice feature, but
11Howard [6, p.106].
12Fine [2] pointed out the similarity between the prisoners’ dilemma and the liberal paradox.
33the real force of this resolution scheme is revealed if we examine the next example which
relates to the internal inconsistency of rights.13
Example 2. Let ¡ ¤ be the same as ¡ in the Example 1 save for the following speciﬁ-
cation of the proﬁle R¤ = (R¤
1;R¤
2):
R¤
1(S) : [s1;s4];[s2;s3],
R¤
2(S) : [s2;s3];[s1;s4].
Consider the metagames (» k)k¡ ¤ and k(» k)¡ ¤. We may verify that M1[21¡ ¤] =
M1[12¡ ¤] = fs1;s4g and M2[21¡ ¤] = M2[12¡ ¤] = fs2;s3g.14 It then follows that
M¤(¡ ¤) = M1[21¡ ¤]\M2[12¡ ¤] = ;, and M¤(¡ ¤) = fM1[21¡ ¤]\M2[12¡ ¤]g[fM1[12¡ ¤]\
M2[12¡ ¤]g = ;. Therefore both metasolution concepts fail to resolve the liberal paradox
embodied in the game ¡ ¤.
4.5. There are two classes of liberal paradox which we should cope with: the Paretian
liberal paradox, and the paradox of the internal inconsistency of rights. We have shown in
the above that the metarational exercising of rights in the situation of complete mutual
prediction may systematically resolve the former class of paradoxes, while the latter
diﬃculty may not be resolved in this manner.
5 Concluding Remarks
In reviewing a number of contributions to the Paretian liberal paradox, Sen [12, p.224]
argued that “[Kelly] identiﬁes a number of diﬃculties with Gibbard’s system [which are]
essentially arising from problems in deciding when a right is useful for a person. ... Some
of these diﬃculties are eliminated by modiﬁcations of the Gibbard system proposed by
Kelly ... .” We have examined in this chapter Gibbard’s system of alienable rights in
the light of Kelly’s proposed modiﬁcations thereof. It was shown that the diﬃculties
identiﬁed by Kelly are more serious than Kelly and Sen have thought them to be, and
they are not eliminated by Kelly’s proposed modiﬁcations. We have also examined the
possibility and limitation of resolving the liberal paradox via the metarational rights-
exercising. In conclusion, it is hoped that the negative results reported in this chapter
will serve to clarify the nature and stubbornness of the paradox of a Paretian liberal.
13See Gibbard’s Wall-Colour Case [3, p.389] and Sen’s Zubeida-Rehana Case [12, p.234]. In the game-
theoretic literature, the game Γ¤ in Example 2 is called the game of Matching Pennies. See Howard [4,
p.182].
14Howard’s Characterization Theorem for Metarational Outcomes [6, pp.89-96] is useful in verifying
these results.
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35Chapter 15
Individual Rights Revisited¤
Introduction
Ever since the publication of Sen’s [13; 14] seminal contributions, the subject of individ-
ual libertarian rights has attracted much attention from economists, and Sen’s paradox
of the impossibility of a Paretian liberal has inspired a large volume of literature which
has spanned several disciplines including economics, philosophy and politics.1 Not sur-
prisingly, Sen’s contributions have provoked controversies. One of the most fundamental
questions raised in this context relates to the very formulation of the concept of liber-
tarian rights due to Sen. It has been contended by Nozick [11], Bernholz [1], G¨ ardenfors
[5] and Sugden [18], among others, that this formulation does not capture our intuitive
notion of rights.2 In an important paper, Sen [16] responded to some of these criti-
cisms. This, however, led to further debates (see Sugden [19]). In this chapter we seek
to highlight some important strands in this debate, and to achieve some clariﬁcation of
the diﬀerent and often incompatible views of individual rights which have generated this
controversy.
It may be worth clarifying at the outset that our basic concern is the formulation of
the notion of individual rights per se, and not the conﬂict between individual rights and
the weak welfarisitic requirement of Pareto optimality. This conﬂict is a fundamental
¤First published in Economica, Vol.59, 1992, pp.161-177 as a joint paper with W. Gaertner and
P. K. Pattanaik. Reprinted in C. K. Rowley, ed., The International Library of Critical Writings in
Economics, Vol.27, Social Justice and Classical Liberal Goals, Cheltenham, Glos.: Edward Elgar, 1993,
pp.592-608. Our greatest debt is to Amartya Sen. Not only were we introduced to the problem of rights
by his writings, but also we have beneﬁted immensely from many discussions we have had with him
over the years. We are also greatful to P. G¨ ardenfors, S. Hansson, S. Kanger, M. Kaneko, I. Levi, D.
Parﬁt, R. Sugden, the editor and two referees of Economica for their helpful comments and discussions.
The generosity of the British Council, Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, the Murphy Institute of Political
Economy (Tulane), the University of Osnabr¨ uck, the University of Birmingham and All Souls College
(Oxford) made this collaborative research possible. We would like to express our sincere gratitude to all
these institutions for their support and hospitality, which far exceeded what we had any right to expect.
An early draft was presented at the Sixth World Congress of the Econometric Society, Barcelona, 22-28
August 1990.
1For a partial survey of the literature, see Sen [15], Suzumura [20, Chapter 7] and Wringlesworth [22].
2See also Gibbard [8].
36problem in the theory of social choice, and has rightly received much attention, thanks
to the path-breaking analysis of Sen. It is our belief that this problem persists under
virtually every plausible concept of individual rights that we can think of. However,
we do not discuss this issue of incompatibility between individual rights and the Pareto
principle, nor do we seek to provide a solution to this problem. Instead, we focus on the
conceptual problem of formulating the notion of individual rights in the theory of social
choice, and the extent to which our intuition about individual rights is captured by the
diﬀerent formulations in the literature.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section I we discuss some of the main
features of Sen’s [14; 15; 16; 17] formulation of individual rights. In Section II we put
forward an example, the analysis of which reveals that our intuitive notion about certain
types of individual rights is not properly captured by Sen’s formulation. In Section III
we generalize our criticism of Sen’s formulation of individual rights, and argue that the
intuitive diﬃculties discussed in Section II aﬀect his formulation in the context of most
rights one can think of. In Section IV an alternative formulation of individual rights in
terms of game forms is introduced, and its relative merit vis-` a-vis Sen’s formulation is
considered. Section V concludes with a brief account of the historical background of our
analysis.
1 Sen’s Formulation of Individual Rights
The basic intuitive idea of individual rights, which Sen [14;15] as well as many of his
critics have sought to capture, can perhaps be best stated in the language of J. S. Mill
[10, Book 5, Chapter 11]: “... there is a circle around every individual human being
which no government, be it that of one, of a few, or of the many, ought to be permitted
to overstep.”
Thus, both Sen and his critics would agree with Mill that each individual should
have a “recognized personal sphere” (RPS) with which the rest of the society should not
be allowed to interfere. Diﬀerences, however, arise when they seek to provide a precise
formulation of this personal sphere and of how the recognition of the personal spheres of
diﬀerent individuals should get reﬂected in the choices made by the society.
Sen’s [14;15] original formulation was in terms of social preferences. Recollect that
the notion of social preferences, so widely used in the theory of social choice, can bear
alternative interpretations, depending on the exact nature of the problem in which one is
interested (see Sen [16]). In this chapter we shall concentrate on the normative problem
of social choice, and Sen’s notion of individual rights will be discussed exclusively in
terms of social choice.
For our purpose, a social state will be interpreted as a complete description of all
aspects of the society that may be considered relevant, such as the colour of individual
i’s bedroom walls, the number of hospital beds available, the consumption of wheat by
each individual and so on. Every individual is assumed to have a preference ordering
over all social states.
The notion of an individual’s RPS constitutes the intuitive foundation of Sen’s [13;
3714] condition of liberalism, which embodies his conception of individual rights. Recollect
that individual i is said to be decisive over fx;yg, where x 6= y, if y (resp. x) will never
be socially chosen when x (resp. y) is available and i strictly prefers x (resp. y) to y
(resp. x). Sen’s condition of liberalism can then be stated as follows:
(1.1) For every individual i, there exist distinct social alternatives x and y such that
i is decisive over fx;yg.
Implicit in (1.1) is the interpretation that the two alternatives, x and y, diﬀer only
with respect to some aspect (e.g. the colour of i’s bedroom walls) which comes within i’s
RPS; otherwise the condition (1.1) can hardly be associated with the notion of libertarian
rights.
Sen’s condition of liberalism can be interpreted in a somewhat weaker sense. Let us
say that i is locally decisive over fx;yg, where x 6= y, if y (resp. x) will never be socially
chosen when x and y are only two available social alternatives and i strictly prefers x
(resp. y) to y (resp. x). Then a weaker interpretation of Sen’s condition can read as
follows:
(1.2) For every individual i, there exist distinct social alternatives x and y such that
i is locally decisive over fx;yg.3
Thus, under Sen’s conception of individual rights, individual i has a right if (1.1) or
(1.2) is satisﬁed.4 For convenience, Sen’s formulation of individual rights in general will
be called formulation S, while the distinction between his formulation is terms of (1.1),
(1.2) and similar other conditions will be indicated by using terms such as formulation
S(1.1), formulation S(1,2) and so on.
Clearly, (1.1) is much stronger than (1.2). It can be easily seen that (1.1) follows from
the conjunction of (1.2) and the following property of social “rationality”:
(1.3) For all social alternatives z and w, if z is socially chosen in rejection of w when
z and w are the only available social alternatives, then the society should never choose
w when z is available.
3As Sen [16] points out, the question of how the social choice is actually made, as distinct from
the question of what alternative society chooses, may be of considerable importance in the context of
individual rights. Thus, individual i, left to himself, may always choose vegetarian food. If, however,
instead of i choosing vegetarian food for himself, he is given vegetarian food by someone else, without
his having a choice, it does seem to make a diﬀerence to his rights. This aspect is ignored in (1.1) and
(1.2).
4Sen’s condition of liberalism admits both these interpretations, since the condition is stated in terms
of social preference rather than social choice, and the strict social preference for x against y can be
translated into the terminology of social choice in at least two ways. It can be interpreted to mean that
y should not be chosen by the society in any choice situation where x is available. Alternatively, it can
be interpreted to mean that, when x and y are the only two available alternatives, society should choose
x and reject y. Depending on which of these two interpretations we adopt, we have either (1.1) or (1.2).
38It is worth noting that Sen [16] explicitly adopts interpretation (1.1) in the context of the
normative problem of social choice, and therefore we shall concentrate mainly on (1.1)
in our subsequent discussion.
Note that (1.1) is stated in terms of the individual’s preferences, but it is easy to
formulate a counterpart of (1.1) in terms of the individual’s (actual or hypothetical)
choice. Consider the following assumption:
(1.4) For all distinct social alternatives, z and w, if individual i has to choose from
the available set fz;wg, then he would choose z and reject w if and only if he prefers
z to w.
This is a highly plausible assumption, especially when z and w are assumed to dif-
fer only with respect to something in i’s RPS. In the presence of (1.4), (1.1) becomes
equivalent to the following:
(1.5) For every individual i, there exist distinct social alternatives x and y such that,
if i would choose x (resp. y) and reject y (resp.x) when asked to choose from fx;yg,
then y (resp.x) should never emerge as the social choice when x (resp. y) is available.
Sen [13;14] has shown that, if the social choice procedure satisﬁes (1.1), then the
procedure will sometimes fail to satisfy the Pareto principle.5 Recollect that the Pareto
principle requires that, if all individuals in the society strictly prefer a social alternative
z to another social alternative w, then w should never emerge as a social outcome when
z is available. While this impossibility result is of crucial importance in several diﬀerent
ways, our basic concern is not with this impossibility result, but with formulation S of
individual rights embodied in (1.1).
Before concluding this section, let us note several distinguished features of formulation
S.
First, in both (1.1) and (1.2), it is an individual’s preference over two complete de-
scriptions of the society (i.e. over two social states), diﬀering only with respect to
that individual’s RPS, which constrains social choice. In (1.2) the constraint is imposed
“locally” on social choice when two complete descriptions of the society constitute the
only feasible social alternatives. In contrast, the constraint on social choice is imposed
“globally” in (1.1). (As we have noted earlier, it is possible to restate the stipulations
regarding individual rights in terms of the individual’s choice rather than the individual’s
preference. However, even when the formulation is in terms of the individual’s choice, it
refers to the individual’s choice from among complete descriptions of the society, which
constitute the diﬀerent feasible social alternatives, just as the formulation in terms of the
individual’s preference refers to the individual’s preference over complete descriptions of
the society, which constitute the relevant social alternatives.)
Second, it is important to remember that Sen intended (1.1) to be only a necessary
condition for individual i to have a right; it was not meant to be a necessary and suﬃcient
5For this impossibility theorem, it is not even necessary to require that (1.1) is satisﬁed. It is suﬃcient
if at least two individuals are decisive over one pair of social alternatives each. This weaker condition is
called by Sen [13;14] the condition of minimal liberalism.
39condition which would capture the entire content of the notion of individual rights. This
being the case, it would be quite unreasonable if, in evaluating formulation S of individual
rights, one were to criticize it on the ground that it failed to capture some part of our
intuition about individual rights, however important that part may happen to be. On the
other hand, it would be a shortcoming of formulation S if it turns out to be inconsistent
with some important aspects of our intuition about individual rights. In the following
sections, we argue that formulation S suﬀers from this type of logical ﬂaws.
Third, it is of interest to note that a somewhat stronger version of (1.1) has been
suggested by Gibbard [7]. Pursuing Sen’s concept of an individual’s RPS, he stipulated
the following condition:
(1.6) For every individual i and for all distinct social alternatives x and y, if x and y
diﬀer only with respect to something in i’s RPS, then i is decisive over fx;yg.
Although (1.6) seems to be much stronger than (1.1), it is not clear why one should
object to (1.6) if one is ready to accept (1.1). At the very least, they seem to have much
in common as far as the underlying motivation goes.
2 Critique of Sen’s Formulation: A Counter-Example
In this section, we consider a simple example to show that there is an important category
of individual rights which do not lend themselves to formulation S(1.1). The right that
we discuss is the right of an individual to choose the colour of his own shirt.6 We shall
later argue that this example has some special features which may not be shared by many
other rights. However, we shall also argue that the intuitive problems that arise when we
seek to formulate this right in terms of (1.1) arise in the context of a very wide range of
rights, and are not at all dependent on these special features. Besides, there are several
fundamental rights, such as the right to choose one’s own religion, the right to believe
and to profess one’s belief in the theory of evolution and so on, which have a structure
similar to that of our example.
Now the example. There are two individuals, the conformist (individual 1) and the
non-conformist (individual 2). Each individual has the right to choose his shirt from
among the shirts which he owns. Each individual has two shirts: white (w) and blue (b).
The two individuals are completely ignorant of each other’s preferences, and at the time
of making his choice each individual is ignorant about the other’s choice. Everything else
being ﬁxed, there are only four social states, (w;w);(b;b);(w;b) and (b;w), where (w;b)
denotes white shirt for 1 and blue shirt for 2, and similarly for other social states. The
two individuals’ preference orderings are as follows:
6This example is due originally to Gibbard [7], though he used it for an entirely diﬀerent purpose.
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(w;w) (b;w)
(b;b) (w;b)
(b;w) (w;w)
(w;b) (b;b)
In words, 1 would like to have w rather than b if 2’s choice is w, whereas he would like to
have b rather than w if 2’s choice is b instead. On the other hand, 2 would like to have
w rather than b if 1’s choice is b, while he would rather have b if 1’s choice is w.
If we want to formulate the right of each individual to choose his shirt in Sen’s terms,
then (1.1) must hold for i = 1;2, so that, given our intuition about each individual’s
RPS in this case, at least one of the conditions (2.1) and (2.2) and also at least one of
the conditions (2.3) and (2.4) must be satisﬁed:
(2.1) 1 is decisive over f(w;w);(b;w)g;
(2.2) 1 is decisive over f(b;b);(w;b)g;
(2.3) 2 is decisive over f(b;w);(b;b)g;
and
(2.4) 2 is decisive over f(w;b);(w;w)g.
We shall now argue that three serious intuitive diﬃculties arise in the context of for-
mulation S(1.1) and some of its natural extensions. For lack of convenient names, we
shall call these problems A, B and C, respectively. Note that problem A aﬀects formula-
tion S(1.1) as well as its extensions, whereas problems B and C aﬀect the extensions of
formulation S(1.1), but not necessarily formulation S(1.1) itself.
Problem A. Suppose that (2.1) holds. Let the two individuals freely choose their shirts
without knowing anything about the other individual’s choice and preferences. Suppose,
given such ignorance, 1 follows the maximin principle and chooses b. Similarly, suppose
2 follows the maximin principle and chooses w. Then (b;w) will emerge as the social
outcome. This would, of course, be inconsistent with (2.1). However, given that (b;w)
arose from the two individuals’ free choices of their respective shirts, very few people
would be willing to say that there was a violation of the right of any individual to choose
his shirt. The fact that each individual is free to choose his shirt without any external
constraint seems to capture the entire intuitive content of our conception of the right
under consideration. Even if, as a result of exercising this freedom of choice, (2.1) is
violated, it does not justify us in saying that there has been a violation of the right of
either individual.
In a similar way, for each of the conditions (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4), it is possible to specify
the individuals’ preference orderings in such a way that, given the maximin behaviour
41on the part of each individual, the free choice of the individuals would give rise to a
social outcome that would contradict the condition under consideration. Since Sen’s
formulation implies that at least one of the four conditions, (2.1), (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4),
must be satisﬁed, it is clear that there are cases where the Sen right of some individual
will be violated, even though, from our intuitive point of view, there is no violation of
any individual’s right.
Note that the assumption of maximin behaviour under uncertainty is not crucial to
our reasoning. However, given complete ignorance about each other’s preferences, there
is no compelling reason why the two individuals should not follow the maximin principle
either. Indeed, given any rule of choice under uncertainty, we can modify the features of
our example suitably to get the same inconsistency between formulation S(1.1) and our
intuition about the right under consideration.
Problem B. Problem A arises irrespective of whether 1 is decisive over only one of
f(w;w);(b;w)g and f(b;b);(w;b)g, or over each of the two sets. However, given that
the pair (w;w) and (b;w), as well as the pair (b;b) and (w;b), diﬀers only with respect
to the colour of individual 1’s shrit, it is not clear why 1 should be decisive over one of
the two-element sets, f(w;w);(b;w)g and f(b;b);(w;b)g,but not the other. In fact, the
appeal to the notion of 1’s RPS may suggest that it would be more natural to assume
that 1 is decisive over both the two-element sets. Presumably, it might have been such
considerations that led Gibbard [7] and several other writers to replace (1.1) by the more
stringent (1.6). However, if we assume that both (2.1) and (2.2) are satisﬁed, then we
have another serious intuitive problem in addition to the one discussed earlier. Put dif-
ferently, (2.1) and (2.2) together imply a type of power for individual 1 that is completely
inconsistent with our intuition.
Consider the type of power that 1 enjoys under our intuitive conception of the right to
choose his shirt. He can choose b, thereby securing that the ﬁnal social outcome will not
lie in the set f(w;w);(w;b)g. Alternatively, he can choose w, thereby securing that the
ﬁnal social outcome will not lie in the set f(b;w);(b;b)g. Thus, 1 has the power to ensure
that the ﬁnal social outcome will never lie in the set f(w;w);(w;b)g and also the power
to ensure that the ﬁnal social outcome will never lie in the set f(b;w);(b;b)g. Under our
intuitive concept of the right, however, there is no way in which 1 can secure that the
ﬁnal social outcome will never lie in the set f(b;w);(w;b)g. Yet this is exactly the power
that 1 has under (2.1) and (2.2), given 1’s preference ordering as speciﬁed earlier. Given
that preference ordering for 1, (2.1) and (2.2) imply that neither (b;w) nor (w;b) must
be the social outcome. Thus, in addition to creating problem A, (2.1) and (2.2) together
give to 1 a preference-based power which runs strongly counter to our intuition.
Problem C. We have considered the anomalies that arise when, by strengthening formula-
tion S(1.1) in a very natural fashion, we assume that both (2.1) and (2.2) hold. However,
if one assumes both (2.1) and (2.2), then it would be natural to assume (2.3) and (2.4)
as well. Indeed, why should we give 1 the Sen rights without giving 2 the corresponding
Sen rights? Suppose that we do this, and consider the implications of assuming that all
the four conditions are satisﬁed.
42Suppose (2.1), (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4) are all satisﬁed and the two individuals’ prefer-
ences are as speciﬁed earlier. Then it is easy to check that, irrespective of the ﬁnal social
outcome that emerges, one of the four conditions is bound to be violated. Thus, if we
accept this very plausible extension of formulation S(1.1), we would have to accept the
inevitability of the violation of someone’s right. This is nothing other than an instance
of the so-called Gibbard paradox. However, whatever may be the ﬁnal outcome, it is not
at all intuitively clear why we should say that anybody’s right is violated; after all, every
individual is choosing completely freely.
As we emphasized earlier, the entire intuitive content of the right in our example
seems to consist of each individual’s freedom to choose a blue shirt or a white shirt for
himself. If each individual freely chooses one of the two shirts available to him, then
some social outcome will emerge from this process of free choice. No matter what shirt
each individual chooses, and no matter what social outcome ﬁnally emerges from their
separate choices, there would be no violation of the right under consideration.7
Let us now examine the origin of all these intuitive diﬃculties in which formulation S(1.1)
and its extensions seem to be enmeshed. Concentrating on formulation S(1.1), consider
problem A. The root of this problem is to be found in the following. Under our intuitive
conception of the right to choose one’s own shirt, the individual enjoys the power to
determine a particular aspect or feature (i.e. the colour of his own shirt) of the social
alternative; and when he makes his choice with respect to this particular aspect, his choice
imposes restriction on the ﬁnal social outcome in so far as, in the ﬁnal social outcome,
that particular aspect must be exactly as he chose it to be. In contrast, formulation
S(1.1) does not mention the individual’s ability to determine a particular aspect of the
social alternative. Instead, the constraint on social choice is linked to the individual’s
preference over some pair(s) of social states or complete descriptions of all aspects of the
society.
7A referee maintained that, while this notion of freedom of choice may capture our intuition about
the right involved in the example at hand, it may leave out some important aspects of other types of
rights. For example, he pointed out that we have ignored the rights such as the “right to conform” and
the “right to be diﬀerent,” which may be associated with Gibbard’s example.
There are two points we would like to make in this context. First, our example is intended to be a
counter-example to show that our intuition about a certain right, i.e. the right to choose one’s own shirt,
can come into direct conﬂict with formulation S(1.1). Since we are interested in providing a counter-
example, we have not analysed other possible rights mentioned by the referee. Second, it is not clear
that the “right to conform” and the “right to be diﬀerent” (as distinct from the “right to choose one’s
own shirt” ) can be captured in terms of (1.1), either. To see this, it is necessary to interpret the “right
to be diﬀerent” carefully. When someone says in a liberal society that “I should have the right to be
diﬀerent in my own dress”, we should not interpret this statement as a claim that he should have the
power to ensure that he should dress diﬀerently from the rest of the society. Rather, we would interpret
it as a claim that he has no obligation not to be diﬀerent from the rest of society in his dress, and
that nobody should penalize him if he manages to be diﬀerent in his dress. (See Kanger and Kanger
[9] for an illuminating formal discussion of the notion of the rights involving absence of obligations as
distinct from the rights involving power.) Hence we would not normally say that the right of the person
concerned to be diﬀerent in his dress has been violated if only he was left free to choose his dress and
to try to be diﬀerent, even if he ended up ﬁnally with the same dress as the rest of society. His lack of
foresight may be lamented, but not his lack of the right.
43Of course, if each possible choice by an individual with respect to the aspect of the
social state, coming within his RPS, was linked to exactly one social state, then there
would be an obvious and tight connection between such choice by the individual and his
preferences over the social states or complete descriptions of the society. However, in
our example no such tight connection exists. Thus, the choice of w by 1 can, depending
on 2’s choice, lead to either (w;w) or (w;b). In the absence of a tight link between the
social states and the alternative options that the individual can choose with respect to
the aspect of social states that falls within his RPS, there arises a tension between our
intuition, which runs in terms of choice of such options, and formulation S(1.1), which
runs in terms of the individuals’ preferences over social states.
To see this clearly, consider what would happen if we had exactly two feasible alterna-
tives, say (w;w) and (b;w), diﬀering with respect to the colour of 1’s shirt; in other words,
1 had two shirts, w and b, but 2 had only one shirt, w. If information about the feasible
set constitutes a part of common knowledge, then 1’s preference over f(w;w);(b;w)g will
have an obvious link with 1’s choice from the set of two options relating to the colour of
his shirt: if (and only if) he strictly prefers (w;w) to (b;w), he will choose (w;w) and
reject (b;w); similarly, if (and only if) he prefers (b;w) to (w;w), he will choose (b;w)
and reject (w;w). Therefore, in this simple case where (w;w) and (b;w) are assumed
to be the only two feasible alternatives, problem A cannot possibly arise, since there is
no plausible way in which it can happen that 1 will choose a colour only to regret that
choice in the light of the (trivial) choice made by 2.
However, when all the four alternatives, (w;w);(w;b);(b;w) and (b;b), are feasible,
the choice of w by 1 is no longer uniquely linked to a single outcome: instead, it is
associated with two possible outcomes, (w;w) and (w;b). Each option of each individual
is, in this fashion, linked to two possible social states. This is what gives rise to problem
A. Note that 1 does not know whether, if he chooses w, (w;w) or (w;b) will ﬁnally arise
as the social outcome, although he does know that neither (b;w) nor (b;b) can arise,
given his choice of w. Likewise, 1 does not know whether, if he chooses b, (b;w) or (b;b)
will emerge as the social outcome. Therefore, it is perfectly possible that he will choose
w even though he prefers (b;w) to (w;w). Similarly, it is perfectly possible for 2 to
choose b. Thus, it is perfectly possible that the two individuals, through their free and
unconstrained choice of a shirt, will end up with the ﬁnal social outcome (w;b) when
there exists another feasible outcome (b;b) where the colour of 2’s shirt is the same as
in (w;b) but which 1 strictly prefers to (w;b). Even if this happens, we do not see any
reason whatsoever to say that 1’s right has been violated.
We have shown that formulation S(1.1) runs into serious problems in our example.
What about the much weaker formulation S(1.2)? It seems to us that no such problem
arises for (1.2), provided that a knowledge assumption (speciﬁed below) is satisﬁed, and
provided one makes the very plausible assumption to the following eﬀect:
(2.5) For any individual i, and for any social alternatives z and w, if z and w are the
only available social alternatives and if i strictly prefers z to w, i will choose z and
reject w whenever he is empowered to act on behalf of the society.
44To substantiate this assertion, remember that (1.2) requires that, if (w;b) and (b;b)
are the only two feasible social alternatives, and if 1 prefers (w;b) to (b;b), then (b;b)
must not be the social outcome. However, in this case each option available to 1 is
linked with a unique social outcome. Then it is clear from our earlier reasoning that,
given the very plausible assumption (2.5), and given that 1 knows the feasible set to be
f(w;b);(b;b)g, there cannot be any conﬂict between our intuition about the right and
formulation S(1.2).
So far we have assumed that the information as to what constitutes the feasible set
of social alternatives is available to both individuals. What happens if the feasible set is
really f(w;b);(b;b)g, but 1 does not know this, and mistakenly thinks that the feasible
set is f(w;b);(b;b);(w;w);(b;w)g? This, of course, means that 1 believes that 2 has two
options, w and b, when actually 2 has only one option, b. Then 1 may adopt the maximin
strategy of choosing a white shirt. In that case, (w;b) will be the social outcome, and
this will violate 1’s right according to formulation S(1.2). However, given that 1 was free
to choose whatever shirt he wanted, we would not want to say that 1’s right has been
violated in any way. Thus, if the knowledge assumption is relaxed, even S(1.2) may turn
out to be inconsistent with our intuition about the right.
Although the counter-example we have considered so far is a representative specimen
from a class of rights that many people would consider to be very basic, the speciﬁc
right discussed has some special features which are not necessarily shared by many other
rights.
First, under the right discussed in our example, the individual, through his actual
choices, directly controls the matters coming within his RPS. Sen [16;17] has argued
very convincingly against viewing rights exclusively in terms of such direct control. If i
is a Hindu, it may be thought that i has a right to be cremated after his death according
to Hindu rituals. However, i can hardly control this aspect of the social state directly
through his actual choice, even though it may be conceded that it comes within his RPS.
To accommodate such instances, however, we have only to broaden the framework so that
matters relating to the RPS of the individual are determined either by the free actual
choice of the individual concerned or by the choice of some other agent acting on behalf
of the individual in accordance with the individual’s hypothetical choice, i.e. the choice
that the individual would make if he were in a position to choose.
Second, the right of the individual in our example consists of his freedom to choose
any one of several options. However, there are many rights that can hardly be expressed
in this way. For example, the case of Mr A, who has a right not to be persecuted by
the state because he is a Hindu, cannot be articulated through Mr A’s freedom to make
certain actual choices. Is it possible to articulate it through his hypothetical choices?
The answer seems to be in the negative. Suppose, in order to achieve martyrdom, Mr A
would very much like to be executed by the government for being a Hindu — indeed, if
he could inﬂuence the government, he would see to it that this would be done. However,
even in this case the government would violate Mr A’s rights if, in deferense to Mr A’s
hypothetical choice, it decided to execute him.
Lastly, in our example, what actions are or are not permissible for the individual does
45not depend on the prior actions of other agents. (In fact, it does not depend on the
prior fulﬁlment of any condition.) In contrast, there are many rights where what actions
are permissible for the agent concerned depends crucially on the prior actions of other
agents. In the next section we shall discuss rights of this type in some detail. Here we
would just like to note that there are important rights which do not share this feature of
our example.
Thus, the right discussed in this section has some special features which may not be
shared by other rights. However, we do believe that many basic rights are structurally
similar to this right. In the next section, we go beyond our counter-example with the
purpose of assessing the applicability of S(1.1) in general, and argue that, in the context
of most rights, formulation S(1.1) and stronger versions of it run into intuitive diﬃculties
exactly similar to the ones we have discussed above.
3 Critique of Sen’s Formulation: Generalization
How widespread is the diﬃculty that arose in our example? With the purpose of settling
this question, let us try to identify systematically the type of rights that do indeed lend
themselves to formulation S. Since our discussion of rights is mainly in the context of
social choice theory, we shall concentrate on constitutional and legal rights.
To begin with, we note that (1.1) needs some modiﬁcation. This is called for if it is to
be applicable to the wide class of individual rights that are contingent on the fulﬁllment
of certain conditions, as well as to the class of individual rights that are not contingent
on any such condition.
Individual rights are indeed often contingent on the prior fulﬁlment of certain condi-
tions: an individual i’s right to go to j’s party is contingent on the condition that j has
invited i to come to j’s party; an individual’s right to criticize the state may be contin-
gent on “normal circumstances” prevailing and may be restricted when the country is
engaged in a war; an individual’s right to travel by a public bus may be subject to the
availability of a vacant seat; and so on. On the other hand, some categories of rights,
e.g. the right to believe or not to believe in the existence of God, may not be contingent
on the prior fulﬁlment of any condition. The number of such non-contingent rights is
perhaps rather small. To be able to take into account rights that are contingent on the
prior fulﬁlment of a certain set of conditions, let Γ = f°1;°2;:::g be the set of alternative
contingencies under each of which a given right can be invoked. Then (1.1) should be
modiﬁed as follows:
(3.1) If a certain contingency in Γ occurs, then, for every individual i, there exist
distinct alternatives, x and y, such that i is decisive over fx;yg.
Clearly, the non-contingent rights can be included in (3.1), where the set Γ covers all
conceivable contingencies.
To what extent is (3.1) consistent with our intuition about individual rights? In
discussing this issue, it seems convenient to invoke the familiar distinction between pas-
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obligations of other agent(s) (individuals, groups, the society, the state, ...) to do or to
refrain from doing something without providing i with any power to do, to have, or to be
anything speciﬁc. For example, the right of an individual i not to be arrested without a
proper warrant implies an obligation of the state not to arrest i without a proper warrant;
but it does not provide i with any power to do, to have or to be anything speciﬁc. In
contrast, an active right ri of an individual i provides i (or some other agent acting on
behalf of i under suitably speciﬁed conditions)9 with a certain power to do, to have or
to be something speciﬁc, which usually accompanies certain obligations of other agents
to do or to refrain from doing something. For example, the right of an individual i to
criticize the state in normal circumstances is an active right. It provides i with a power
to do something that expresses his criticism, which is accompanied by an obligation of
the state not to imprison, interfere with, persecute or execute i for his doing that act.
We shall argue that formulation S(3.1) is consistent neither with passive rights nor with
active rights unless certain very restrictive conditions are fulﬁlled.
Consider passive rights ﬁrst. By deﬁnition, a passive right ri of an individual i simply
imposes certain obligations on other agents without paying any particular attention to i’s
preferences; neither does it provide i with any power to choose anything in accordance
with i’s preferences. It should be clear, therefore, that the category of passive rights
cannot properly be captured by formulation S which postulates a link between the ﬁnal
social choice and the right-holder’s preferences over certain pairs of social alternatives.
In order to avoid possible misunderstandings, let us examine once again the passive
right against arrest without a proper warrant. It is true that this right might have been
conferred originally with a certain presumption about people’s “usual” preferences, which
would go against arrest without a warrant. However, whatever may be the reason that
lies behind the introduction of such a right in the ﬁrst place, the formal structure of this
right, once introduced, seems to be independent of the individuals involved. In other
words, i’s right against arrest without a proper warrant prohibits a speciﬁc action of the
state, which remains in force even if i would like to be arrested without a warrant for
reasons of his own. Likewise, the origin of passive rights such as the protection from being
robbed, the provision of ﬁre-ﬁghting service in case one’s house catches ﬁre and so on may
be traced back to the presumption that people usually prefer the state to provide these
services. However, once these passive rights come into existence, their structure may
often be independent of the preferences of speciﬁc individuals involved. In such cases,
it is clear that the passive rights would not lend themselves to the preference-based
formulation S(3.1).
How about active rights? To be speciﬁc, suppose that ri is an active right of an indi-
8See Feinberg [3;4] for a very lucid discussion of this important distinction.
9Strictly speaking, whenever we talk about the power or freedom of an individual i under an active
right, we should refer to the power or freedom that he, or some other agent acting on his behalf under
suitably speciﬁed conditions, enjoys. In what follows, we shall leave out the lengthy phrase ‘or some other
agent acting on his behalf under suitably speciﬁed conditions’ for the sake of expositional convenience,
but it should not be construed to imply that we subscribe to a narrow view of active rights, which
visualizes these rights only in terms of direct choice made by the individual concerned.
47vidual i, which becomes eﬀective under any contingency in a subset Γ(ri) of Γ. (Needless
to say, if ri is a non-contingent active right, then Γ(ri) covers all conceivable contingen-
cies.) Since ri is an active right, i is endowed with a power to choose (to do, to have,
to be, ...) something from, say, a set Ω(°) = f!1;!2;:::g of options when a contingency
° 2 Γ(ri) obtains. Given the right ri, and given ° 2 Γ(ri), the choice of ! 2 Ω(°) by i
may imply certain obligations ¾q(°;!) for another agent q in a set Q(°;!).
It may help if we illustrate these notions in terms of an example. Consider an indi-
vidual i’s active right ri of going or not going to j’s party, assuming that j has invited i
in the ﬁrst place. Here Γ(ri) = fj invites i to his partyg. Given that j has invited i, i is
free to go or not to go. Thus, Ω(j invites i to his party)= fto go, not to gog. If j invites
i and i chooses to go (resp. not to go), then every other individual q has an obligation
not to harass i for going to j’s party (resp. not to harass i for not going to j’s party).
Hence, Q(j invites i, to go) as well as Q(j invites i, not to go) is the set of all individuals
other than i. For all q 2 Q(j invites i, to go), ¾q(j invites i, to go) = fdon’t harass i for
goingg. Similarly, for all q 2 Q(j invites i, not to go), ¾q(j invites i, not to go) = fdon’t
harass i for not goingg.
We are now ready to argue that active rights, in general, cannot be properly articu-
lated through formulation S(3.1).
Let F = ff1;f2;:::g be the set of all feature indices involved in the formal description
of the social alternatives. In relation to an active right ri of an individual i, suppose that
° 2 Γ(ri) obtains, so that ri becomes eﬀective, and i knows that this has happened.
This fact, in itself, will specify some features of the social alternatives. If i exercises ri
and chooses an option ! 2 Ω(°), some other features of the social alternatives will be
thereby speciﬁed. The agents q 2 Q(°;!) are constrained by their obligations ¾q(°;!)
under ri. The fulﬁlment of these obligations will specify still further features of the
social alternatives. If i understands the nature of his endowed active right ri, it is not
unreasonable to presume that i knows all these speciﬁcations of the features of the social
alternatives which follow from the invocation of his active right ri.
Let F(°;!) stand for the set of all feature indices which are thus speciﬁed by ° 2 Γ(ri),
! 2 Ω(°), and ¾q(°;!) (q 2 Q(°;!)), and known as such by i. The crucial question is
whether or not F(°;!) exhausts all the feature alternatives.
Suppose, for some ° 2 Γ(ri) and some ! 2 Ω(°), that F n F(°;!) is non-empty.
Then, given °, the option ! 2 Ω(°) of i will be associated not with one unique social
outcome, but with several possible outcomes, any one of which may materialize depending
on the exact fashion in which the residual features f 2 F n F(°;!) are determined. If
these residual features matter at all for i’s preferences, we shall have exactly the same
diﬃculties that we encountered in our previous example.
The general reasoning presented above may be illustrated by referring to the example
of the party. To keep our reasoning transparent, let us assume that it is physically
impossible for anyone to harass anyone else for going or not going to someone’s party.
While this assumption is not at all essential, it greatly simpliﬁes our reasoning by enabling
us to ignore the implied obligations of other agents.
Assume now that j has decided to invite both i and k, and this fact is known to
48both i and k. This clearly determines a feature of the social alternatives as far as j’s
invitation to i and k is concerned. Individual i can now decide whether or not to go to j’s
party. Suppose that he has to make his decision without knowing whether or not k has
decided to go to the party. If i decides to go to j’s party, a further feature of the social
alternatives will be determined, i.e. whether i goes or does not go to j’s party. However,
there remains a residual feature relating to k’s choice, and i has decided whether or not
to go to j’s party without knowing how this feature is going to be decided. Therefore, in
i’s own mind, the option of his going to j’s party is associated with two possible social
outcomes: (i goes to j’s party, k goes to j’s party) and (i goes to j’s party, k does not
go to j’s party). Similarly for i’s option of not going. Given this leeway, it can now be
easily shown that, irrespective of whether formulation S(3.1) gives to i decisiveness over
f(i goes to j’s party, k goes to j’s party), (i does not go to j’s party, k goes to j’s party)g
or over f(i goes to j’s party, k does not go to j’s party), (i does not go to j’s party, k
goes to j’s party)g or over f(i goes to j’s party, k does not go to j’s party), (i does not
go to j’s party, k does not go to j’s party)g, formulation S(3.1) contradicts our intuition
just as in our previous example.
It should now be clear that the problem with formulation S(3.1) can be avoided only
under a very restrictive condition, which reads as follows:
(3.2) For all i, all ° 2 Γ(ri), and all ! 2 Ω(°), the features in F n F(°;!), if any, do
not aﬀect the relative desirability for i of the options in Ω(°).
It seems to us that (3.2) is a quite stringent condition which is likely to be violated
in many important cases. If this is the price we have to pay in order to articulate active
rights through formulation S(3.1), then it would seem necessary to search for a better
alternative. Such an alternative formulation of rights will be discussed in the next section.
4 An Alternative Formulation of Individual Rights:
Game Form Approach
In discussing individual rights, we have emphasized that every active right of i implies
the freedom of i (or someone acting on i’s behalf) to choose from a certain set of options
or actions; and i’s choice of one of these options, in its turn, implies obligations of certain
other agents to do or not to do something. On the other hand, every passive right of i
just implies the obligation of certain other agents to do or not to do something. Thus,
in general, a right of i implies certain restrictions on the set of permissible actions, any
one of which may be chosen by individuals including i himself. This basic idea suggests
a very natural formal framework for articulating rights, where the notion of game form
plays the central role.10
Formally, a game form is a speciﬁcation of:
10The concept of a game form is due originally to Gibbard [6]. The formulation of rights in terms of
game forms originates in G¨ ardenfors [5] and Sugden [19].
49(a) a set N of n players;
(b) a set Sk of strategies for each player k 2 N;
(c) a set X of all feasible outcomes; and
(d) an outcome function which speciﬁes exactly one outcome for each element of
Πk2NSk (i.e. for each jNj-tuple of strategies, one strategy for each player).
Given a game form, when we specify the preferences of the players, we have a game.
The content of individual rights in this framework lies in a speciﬁcation of the ad-
missible strategies for each player k 2 N, and the complete freedom of each player to
choose any of the admissible strategies and/or the obligation of the agents not to choose
a non-admissible strategy.
Let us illustrate this formulation in terms of the party example.11 Individual j has
two admissible strategies:
yj : to invite i;
y0
j : not to invite i;
whereas individual i has two admissible strategies:
yi : if j does not invite him, then he stays at home, and if j invites him, then he
declines and stays at home.
y0
i : if j does not invite him, then he stays at home, and if j invites him, then he
accepts and goes to the party.
Note that we have expressed the relevant game form in its normal form. Note also that
(yi;yj) leads to j’s inviting i and j’s invitation being declined by i who stays at home;
(y0
i;yj) leads to j’s inviting i and j’s invitation being accepted by i; and so on. It is clear
that our intuitive notion of j’s right to invite or not to invite i to his party and i’s right
to accept or not accept j’s invitation is reﬂected in the speciﬁcation of the admissible
strategies for the two individuals. For example, it is not an admissible strategy for i to
extract an invitation at gun point if j does not invite i in the ﬁrst instance, nor is it
admissible for i to go to j’s party without receiving an invitation from j in the ﬁrst place.
It is, however, possible to specify the game form in such a way that the strategy,
y00
i : If j does not invite i, then i forces his way into the party with a gun, and if j
invites i on his own, then i goes to j’s party,
is a feasible strategy for i, but the outcome function is such that the combination (y00
i ;yj)
leads to i’s spending some time in prison. Thus, in general, the content of individual
rights in this framework is reﬂected in the speciﬁcation of the sets of admissible strategies,
and the outcome function which reﬂects, so to speak, the ‘rules of the game’.
This formulation of individual rights via a game form, game form formulation for
short, accommodates most instances of what we would intuitively think of as individual
11Many other illustrations of this approach can be found in Suzumura [21].
50rights, which cannot be so easily accommodated by formulation S. For example, readers
can easily check that both the right to choose one’s own shirt and the right to decide
whether or not to go to the invited party, which we have shown to create so much diﬃ-
culty for formulation S, can be articulated through the game form formulation without
any diﬃculty whatsoever. In each case, an appropriate speciﬁcation of the set of permis-
sible strategies for each player can completely capture the intuitive content of the right
concerned.
Several general remarks on the nature of the game form formulation seem to be in
order.
First, it is obvious that the notion of a game form, by itself, has very little to do
with rights. All that we are claiming is that rights are best modelled as game forms,
with strategy sets being interpreted as the sets of legally or socially admissible strategies
for each and every agent. Of course, one can think of numerous game forms in various
other contexts (e.g. feuds between two maﬁa families, with murder, abduction and arson
being the strategies), where the question of rights does not arise at all. It is the speciﬁc
interpretation of the strategies and the outcome function that determines whether the
game form is intended to capture some rights in the sense of game form formulation.
Note that, in formulation S of individual rights as well, it is not the formal speciﬁcation
of decisiveness of an individual over a pair of social states as such, but the speciﬁc
interpretation of the intuitive basis of such decisiveness, which brings rights into the
picture.12
Second, how does the society decide which strategies should or should not be admis-
sible for a speciﬁc player in a given context? In other words, how are rights granted in
the ﬁrst place in the framework of game form formulation of individual rights? This is an
important question, but we ignore it here, since we are not addressing the problem of how
or why rights come into existence. Our purpose is to discuss the relatively limited issue
of the formal structure of individual rights and the implications thereof, assuming that
the society, for some reason or other, has decided to grant certain rights to some agents.
From the formal point of view, the important aspect is that the rights of an individual i in
game form formulation always take the form of i’s freedom to choose a strategy from the
set of all admissible strategies for him, and/or a speciﬁcation of the admissible strategies
for some other agent(s). Depending on the situation, the intuitive interpretation of such
speciﬁcation can be in terms of either a prohibition of certain strategies for these other
agents, or their obligation to adopt certain types of strategies.
Lastly, it is worth noting that our game form formulation is in terms of normal game
forms, and to that extent it suﬀers from the usual drawbacks of normal game forms.
Thus, it is well known that the intuition of certain extensive games cannot be adequately
captured in terms of games in normal form. By relying on the normal game form, our
12Indeed, Sen [14, p.89] was careful enough to point out that the acceptability of formulation S
will “depend on the nature of the alternatives that are oﬀered for choice”, and “if the choices are all
non-personal, e.g. whether or not to outlaw untouchability, to declare war against another country”,
formulation S “should not have much appeal”. It is only when two social alternatives are interpreted as
diﬀering solely with respect to someone’s personal life that formulation S was intended to apply.
51formulation also suﬀers from this problem.13 However, despite this, it would seem to
provide a far more ﬂexible and adequate framework for analysing a wide range of rights
than is provided by the classical formulation in Sen’s terms.
5 Historical Background
In this chapter, we have concentrated on the problem of formulating, formally, the notion
of individual rights, as distinct from the problems of compatibility of individual rights and
other social values and possible ethical justiﬁcations for individual rights. No attempt
will be made here to summarize our arguments. Instead, we shall give a brief historical
account of the ways in which diﬀerent writers have tried to capture the intuition about
individual rights in an analytical framework.
Sen [13;14] was, of course, the ﬁrst writer to introduce the concept of individual
rights into the formal theory of social choice and welfare economics, and to analyse the
implications of such rights. Much of the literature on rights in social choice theory and
welfare economics over the last two decades has evolved around Sen’s formulation which
we have discussed in detail in the preceding sections.
One of the earliest critiques of Sen’s formulation of individual rights came from Nozick
[11]. According to him,“[i]ndividual rights are co-possible; each person may exercise
his rights as he chooses. The exercise of these rights ﬁxes some features of the world.
Within the constraints of these ﬁxed features, a choice can be made by a social choice
mechanism based on a social ordering, if there are any choices left to make!” (Nozick
[11, p.166]: emphasis added). These lines have several nuances. However, what seems to
be particularly important in the context of our analysis is that Nozick, unlike Sen, does
not visualize individual rights in terms of restrictions on social choice which are linked
to the individual’s preference over pairs of social alternatives or complete descriptions
of the society. Instead, Nozick visualizes the right of an individual in terms of the
individual’s freedom to choose from among several available options relating to some
speciﬁc aspect of the social states, and the constraints on social choice are imposed when
the individual, exercising his right, does choose one of the options. (Recall Nozick’s [11,
p.166] well-known example of his choosing to live in Massachusetts or New York.) Note
that, under Nozick’s conception, the individual’s act of choice from among the alternative
options ﬁxes only some features of the social states; and this, rather than the individual’s
preferences over some pairs of social states, imposes the constraint on social choice. The
similarity of all this to our discussion of the individual’s right to choose his own shirt is
obvious and does not need any further elaboration. It is of interest to note that Bernholz
[1] seems to have taken a similar view of the formal structure of individual rights.
The explicit formulation of rights in terms of game forms was given in an important
paper by G¨ ardenfors [5]. However, G¨ ardenfors chose to provide the formal representation
of rights in terms of “eﬀectivity functions” rather than in terms of game forms.14 As far
13For a discussion of some of these issues, see Deb [2].
14For the notion of eﬀectivity functions, see Peleg [12]. See Deb [2] for an illuminating discussion of
various issues relating to the representation of rights in terms of eﬀectivity functions.
52as we are aware, the explicit use of normal game forms for representing rights was ﬁrst
suggested by Sugden [19].
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55Chapter 16
Welfare, Rights, and Social Choice
Procedure: A Perspective¤
1 Introduction
It is slightly ironic that the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function and the Arrow
social welfare function, which have so much to contrast with each other in many impor-
tant respectsℤhave a basic feature in common.1. Despite the fact that it is the Arrow
impossibility theorem and nothing else that poses a devastating criticism against the
possibility of the democratic Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function, both concepts
hinge on the informational basis which is welfaristic in nature.2
¤First published in Analyse & Kritik, Vol.18, 1996, pp.20-37. For many helpful discussions on this and
related issues over many yearsℤI am most grateful to Professors Kenneth J. ArrowℤPeter J. Hammondℤ
Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Amartya K. Sen.
1At the risk of reminding readers of what is obvious to them, note that the Bergson-Samuelson
social welfare function is “a function of all the economic magnitudes of a system which is supposed to
characterize some ethical belief ::: . Any possible opinion is admissible ::: . We only require that the
belief be such as to admit of an unequivocal answer as to whether one conﬁguration of the economic
system is ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than any other or ‘indiﬀerent’ℤand that these relationships are transitive ::: .
The function need only be ordinally deﬁned ::: . A more extreme assumption ::: states that individuals’
preferences are to ‘count’. lf any movement leaves an individual on the same indiﬀerence curveℤthen the
social welfare function is unchangedℤand similarly for an increase or decrease” (Samuelson [27, pp.221-
228]. In contrast, “[b]y [the Arrow] social welfare function will be meant a process or rule whichℤfor each
set of individual orderings R1;:::;Rn for alternative social states (one ordering for each individual)ℤ
states a corresponding social ordering of alternative social states, R. ::: [The Arrow] social welfare
function ::: is a method of choosing which social welfare function of the Bergson type will be applicable
::: . Since we are trying to describe social welfare and not some sort of illfare, we must assume that the
social welfare function is such that the social ordering responds positively to alterations in individual
values, or at least not negatively. Hence, if one alternative social state rises or remains still in the
ordering of every individual without any other change in those orderings, we expect that it risesℤor at
least does not fallℤin the social ordering” (Arrow [1, pp.23-25]).
2According to Sen [33, p.464], “[w]elfarism implies that any two states of aﬀairs that are identical
in terms of individual utility characteristics must be judged to be equally good no matter how diﬀerent
they are in nonutility respects, and also that any state that has more utility for someone and no less
utility for anyone in comparison with another state is a better state than the other.” The latter property,
which is called the Pareto Principle, is also shared by the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function
and the Arrow social welfare function.
56In the case of the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function, this fact is quite ex-
plicit. For each proﬁle u = (u1;u2;:::;un) of ordinal individual utilities, where ui (i =
1;2;:::;n) denotes person i’s ordinal utility and n denotes the number of persons in
the society, the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function f maps u into an ordinal in-
dex of social welfare: u = f(u).3 Thus, social welfare judgements in accordance with
the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function depend on the information of individual
utilities and nothing else. In the case of the Arrow social welfare function F, which
maps each proﬁle R = (R1;R2;:::;Rn) of individual preference orderings over the set
X of all conceivable social states, where Ri (i = 1;2;:::;n) denotes person i’s individual
preference ordering, into a social preference ordering R = F(R), this fact is less conspic-
uous.4 However, it is known that the Arrow social welfare function satisﬁes the following
property with strong welfaristic ﬂavour:5
Strong Neutrality: For any pairs fx;yg and fa;bg of social states and for
any proﬁles R1 = (R1
1;R1
2;:::;R1
n) and R2 = (R2
1;R2
2;:::;R2
n) of individ-
ual preference orderings, if xR1
iy holds if and only if aR2
ib holds for all
i = 1;2;:::;nℤthen xR1y holds if and only if aR2b holds, where R1 = F(R1)
and R2 = F(R2).
Thusℤsocial welfare judgements in accordance with the Arrow social welfare function
depend on the information of relative positions of social states in the individual preference
orderings and all other characteristic features of social states are deemed completely
irrelevant. It is against this common welfaristic feature that underlies traditional welfare
economics and social choice theory that Sen’s “Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal” was
meant to cast a serious doubt. Whatever else we may say for or against Sen’s impossibility
theoremℤit is in this arena that the value of his contribution should be tested in the
ﬁnal analysis. Hic Rhodes, hic salta.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2, Sen’s original formulation of
the concept of individual liberty and his impossibility theorem are brieﬂy recapitulated.
Section 3 examines Sen’s formulation of individual liberty in the light of several criticisms
raised against it. In Section 4, we identify three crucial problems that should be squarely
examined by any theoretical approach to the concept of individual liberty. Section 5 is
devoted to the evaluation of Sen’s criticism against the welfaristic foundation of normative
economics. Section 6 concludes.
3See Samuelson [27, p. 228].
4An ordering R on a set X is a binary relation deﬁned over X satisfying: (a) [Completeness]: For
any x;y in X, either xRy or yRz holds; and (b) [Transitivity]: For any x;y and z in X, xRy and yRz
imply xRz. A preference ordering R on X is deﬁned to mean that xRy holds if and only x is at least as
preferable as y. When x is strictly preferred to y, viz. when xRy holds but yRx does not hold, we write
xP(R)y.
5See Sen [31; 32] for the formal proof of this important fact.
572 Sen’s Concept of Individual Liberty and the Im-
possibility of a Paretian Liberal
Sen’s concept of individual liberty is phrased in the context of social choice framework
which is slightly more general than that of Arrow [1]. Let X and N = f1;2;:::;ngℤ
where n is a ﬁnite integer which is no less than 2, be the set of all conceivable social
states and the set of all persons in the society, respectively. Σ denotes a family of non-
empty subsets of X. Each element of Σ is meant to denote an opportunity set, which
the society faces under suitably speciﬁed conditions. It is assumed that there exists no
restriction on how the individual evaluates social states from his/her idiosyncratic point
of view. Thus, each and every person can have whatever preference ordering over X
he/she cares to express. Given any proﬁle R = (R1;R2;:::;Rn) of individual preference
orderingsℤand given any opportunity set S in Σℤthe society must choose something from
S, paying proper attention to the distribution of persons’ wishes which is summarized
by R. Let C(S;R) be the non-empty subset of S consisting of all social states which the
society chooses from S when R summarizes peoples’ wishes. C(S;R) is to be called the
social choice set for (S;R). A function C which is deﬁned on the Cartesian product of
Σ and Ω, where Ω stands for the set of all logically conceivable proﬁles, and maps each
(S;R) into C(S;R) will be called the collective choice rule.
Let us say that a group D of persons is decisive over a pair fx;yg of social states if
and only if D can secure that y(resp. x) does not belong to C(S;R) as long as x(resp.
y) is available in S by expressing unanimous preference within D for x(resp. y) against
y(resp. x). If it so happens that a singleton set fig is decisive over fx;yg for some person
i in N, we say that the person i is decisive over fx;yg. We are now ready to state the
following:6
Sen’s Minimal Liberty: There are at least two persons such that for each of
them there is at least one pair of social states over which he/she is decisive.
The intended meaning of this condition is illustrated by Sen as follows: “Given other
things in the society, if you prefer to have pink walls rather than white, then [the] society
should permit you to have this, even if a majority of the community would like to see
your walls white. Similarly, whether you should sleep on your back or on your belly is
a matter in which the society should permit you absolute freedom, even if a majority of
the community is nosey enough to feel that you must sleep on your back (Sen [29, p.
152]).”
Note that, to be concordant with this intuitive justiﬁcation, the pair of social states
which are mentioned in Sen’s condition should be such that they diﬀer only in the men-
tioned person’s personal matter.
6There are many versions of Sen’s condition of minimal liberty, depending on how we specify the
social choice framework as well as on how we deﬁne social preference. See, among others, Sen [30; 33;
35; 36], and Pattanaik [25; 26]. The version used in the text is taken from Sen [29, p. 156, footnote 4].
Whichever version we may pick from among the many alternatives, the following points basically hold
mutatis mutandis.
58To make this crucial point explicit, let X0 denote the set of all impersonal features of
the society, and let Xi, where i is any element in N, denote the set of all personal features
of person i. Then, X is the Cartesian product of X0;X1;:::;Xn, and each and every social
state x is represented by an (n + 1)-tuple of feature alternatives: x = (x0;x1;:::;xn)ℤ
where x0 is taken from X0 and xi for each i in N is taken from Xi. For convenience,
let x¡i for each i in N be deﬁned by x¡i = (x0;x1;:::;xi¡1;xi+1 :::;xn) and let x be
denoted alternatively as x = (xi;x¡i). Let j and k be two persons mentioned in Sen’s
conditionℤand let fxi;yig(i = j;k) be the pair of social states over which person i is
decisive. In order for Sen’s formulation to be consistent with his intuitive concept of
individual liberty, we must have xi
¡i = yi
¡i for i = j;k, so that xi and yi diﬀer only in
person i’s personal feature.
Turning to the other requirement on collective choice rule, let us now introduce a
widely known condition which is welfaristic in nature:7
Pareto Principle: If every person in the society prefers any social state x
to another social state y, then y should never be socially chosen from any
opportunity set S which contains x.
Since the Pareto Principle has seldom been seriously challenged as a reasonable re-
quirement on social welfare judgements, there is no wonder that Sen’s impossibility theo-
rem to the eﬀect that there exists no collective choice rule satisfying Sen’s minimal liberty
as well as the Pareto principle caused a stir. As Sen [29, p.157] put it in his ﬁrst paper on
the impossibility of a Paretian liberal, “the moral [of this impossibility theorem] is that in
a very basic sense liberal values conﬂict with the Pareto principle. ::: [I]f someone does
have certain liberal values, then he may have to eschew his adherence to Pareto optimal-
ity.” A truly devastating criticism against the welfaristic basis of normative economics
indeed.
Before proceeding to the critical examination of Sen’s condition of minimal liberty,
it may be worth examining Gibbard’s [14] extension of this condition. The gist of his
extension is that if a person, say i, is warranted by the society’s collective choice rule
to be decisive over fxi;yig, where xi = (xi
i;xi
¡i) and yi = (yi
i;xi
¡i), it does not make
much intuitive sense to deny i’s decisiveness over fzi;wig, where zi = (xi
i;z¡i) and
wi = (yi
i;z¡i). After all, if Ian is empowered to paint his bedroom walls pink rather than
white when all other persons paint theirs yellow, why should we not empower him to use
pink rather than white when all other persons are using blue instead? Likewiseℤwhy
should we not empower John, Kevin and Liz to choose the colour of their bedroom walls
freely when we empower Ian in this way? Presumably, it was these considerations that
led Gibbard [14] to formulate the following natural extension of Sen’s condition:
Gibbard’s Libertarianism: Each person i in N is decisive over the pair of
social states fxi;yig, where xi = (xi;x¡i) and yi = (yi;x¡i), whatever may
be the speciﬁcation of xi;yi, and x¡i.
7This version of the Pareto Principle is also taken from Sen [29, p.156].
59Despite the common intuitive root of Sen’s minimal liberty and Gibbard’s libertari-
anismℤthe logical consequence of Gibbard’s libertarianism is even more disturbing than
Sen’s impossibility of a Paretian liberal. Indeed, it is shown by Gibbard [14] that there
exists no collective choice rule satisfying Gibbard’s libertarianism. The gist of this result
can be illustrated by the situation where N = f1;2g, X0 = fx0g and Xi = fa;bg for
i = 1;2. Let x = (x0;a;a), y = (x0;a;b), z = (x0;b;a) and w = (x0;b;b). Suppose
that the two persons have the following preference orderings: xP(R1)z, zP(R1)w, and
wP(R1)y for person 1, and zP(R2)w, wP(R2)y and yP(R2)x for person 2. Given this
proﬁle R = (R1;R2) and an opportunity set S = fx;y;z;wgℤGibbard’s libertarianism
dictates that the social choice set C(S;R) cannot but be empty, given the decisiveness of
person 1 (resp. person 2) over fx;zg and fy;wg (resp. fx;yg and fz;wg). Whichever state
in S the society choosesℤit cannot but violate either person 1’s or person 2’s decisiveness.
The moral is that Sen’s concept of liberty in the form generalized by Gibbard generates
a system of individual claim rights to collective choice rule, which is self-contradictory.
The Gibbard impossibility theorem leads us to an interesting further question. Under
what conditions can we assure the existence of a collective choice rule which materializes a
system of individual claim rights generated by Sen’s requirement of individual liberty? A
complete answer to this question may be found in Suzumura ([42]; [43]; [46, Chpater 7])ℤ
but the essence of the answer is simple, which can be intuitively illustrated in terms of
Figure 1. Note that person 1 is decisive over fx;zg and fy;wg and person 2 is decisive
over fx;yg and fz;wg. Thus, we can start from any state in S, say x, and follow a
path along the edges of the rectangle in Figure 1, say from x to y to w to z, and come
back to x again. Along this loopℤeach and every edge consists of a pair of social states
over which either person 1 or person 2 has decisiveness. It is the existence of such a
critical loop that underlies the Gibbard impossibility theorem. Excluding the occurence
of such a critical loop is necessary and suﬃcient for the existence of a collective choice rule
which materializes a system of individual claim rights generated by Sen’s requirement of
individual liberty.
Figure 1: Gibbard’s Impossibility Theorem
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Note: person 1 has decisiveness over fx;zg and fy;wg,
while person 2 has decisiveness over fz;wg and fx;yg.
603 Sen’s Formulation of Individual Liberty: Critical
Examination
Given the basic nature of Sen’s criticism, it is all too natural that the impossibility of a
Paretian liberal has been under careful scrutiny along several lines.8 Given our present
purpose, we have only to focus on the way in which Sen crystallized his intuition on
individual liberty in terms of the analytical framework of social choice theory.
The ﬁrst misgivings, which are frequently expressed in the literature, criticize Sen’s
formulation of individual liberty as having failed to consider “a strong libertarian tra-
dition of free contract”, according to which “a person’s rights are for his to use or to
bargain away as he ﬁnds ﬁt (Gibbard [14, p.397]).” This viewpoint was most conspicu-
ously formulated by Harel and Nitzan [19]. lt is through the careful examination of their
proposal that we can pinpoint the crucial problem underlying this escape route from
Sen’s impossibility theorem.9
The gist of the Harel-Nitzan proposal can be crystallized in terms of a simple example
due to Sen [29]. There is a single copy of Lady Chatterley’s Lover. Everything else
being the same, there are three social states: Mr. P (the prude) reading it (rP)ℤMr.
L (the lascivious) reading it (rL), and no one reading it (r0). Mr. P ranks them in
the descending order of r0;rP;rL, whereas Mr. L ranks them in the descending order of
rP;rL;r0. Since to read a book or not is ordinarily construed as a person’s private matter
and no other person’s business, Sen endows Mr. P (resp. Mr. L) with decisiveness over
frP;r0g (resp. frL;r0g).10 Given this system of claim rights based on the decisiveness
of persons, and given the proﬁle R = (RP;RL) of individual preference orderings we
have speciﬁed, the social choice set C(frP;rL;r0g;R) cannot but be empty, vindicating
Sen’s impossibility theorem. In this situation, Harel and Nitzan call our attention to the
fact that Mr. P (resp. Mr. L) has ordinally stronger preference for r0 against rL than
that for r0 against rP (resp. for rP against r0 than that for rL against r0).11 Thus, so
the Harel-Nitzan argument goes, Mr. P has incentive to exchange his claim right based
on his decisiveness over fr0;rPg with the claim right of Mr. L based on his decisiveness
over frL;r0g. Mr. L is similarly motivated. If this mutually beneﬁcial exchange of claim
rights are in fact realized between Mr. P and Mr. L, bringing Mr. P (resp. Mr. L) to
be decisive over frL;r0g (resp. fr0;rPg), then the impossibility result identiﬁed by Sen
evaporates. Indeed, the social choice after the realization of voluntary exchange of claim
rights will be frPg.
8For surveys of some of these works, see Sen [30; 35; 36], Suzumura [46, Chapter 7], and Wriglesworth
[50].
9The following analysis is based on Suzumura [48]. See also Breyer [6].
10Note that there exists no critical loop in the distribution of decisiveness in this exampleℤso that
the Gibbard impossibility theorem does not have any bite in this context.
11When a preference ordering R is such that xP(R)y, yP(R)z and xP(R)z hold, we say that the
preference for x against z is ordinally stronger than that for x against y. Likewise, the preference for x
against z is ordinally stronger than that for y against z. It was Blau [5] who introduced this concept
into social choice theory, but the origin of the concept goes back at least as far as to Luce and Raiﬀa
[21].
61Noteℤhoweverℤthat this “resolution” of the impossibility of a Paretian liberal has
very little to commend itself to a person with liberal belief in the ordinary sense of the
word. Indeed, to enable Mr. A to choose whether Mr. B should or should not read a
book, not in view of Mr. B’s own preferences but in view of Mr. A’s preferences, is not
liberalism but paternalism, and a liberal may well regard paternalism as the worst form
of despotism imaginable.
The problem with the Harel-Nitzan scheme does not end there. Consider the situation
where N = f1;2g, X = fv;w;x;y;zg and person 1 (resp. person 2) is decisive over fx;yg
and fv;zg (resp. fv;xg and fw;zg). As is clear from the LHS of Figure 2, there is no
critical loop in the system of claim rights generated by this distribution of decisive power.
Suppose that the proﬁle of individual preference orderings are as follows: xP(R1)v,
vP(R1)w, wP(R1)y, yP(R1)z, vP(R2)y, yP(R2)z, zP(R2)x, and xP(R2)w. It is clear
that person 1 has ordinally stronger preference for x against z than that for x against
y. Likewise, person 2 has ordinally stronger preference for y against w than that for z
against w. In the situation like this, Harel and Nitzan allow the two persons to realize
the mutually beneﬁcial exchange of social states y and z to create a new pair fx;zg for
1 and fw;yg for 2, over which they are decisive. This is obviously bizarre. To exchange
a pair of social states, over which a person has a claim right, with another pair of social
states, over which the exchange partner has a claim right, has a clear meaning, but to
exchange social states between persons so as to concoct new decisive pairs of social states
does not make any sense at all. Worse still, if this bizarre exchange is somehow enforced,
the resulting assignment of claim rights has a critical loop, even though such a loop did
not exist before the exchange. See the RHS of Figure 2.
Figure 2: Logical Diﬃculty of Harel-Nitzan Libertarian Right
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Note: In LHS, 1 (resp. 2) has decisiveness over fx;yg and fv;zg (resp. fv;xg
and fw;zg), while in RHS, 1 (resp. 2) has decisiveness over fx;zg and fv;zg
(resp. fw;yg and fv;xg).
We cannot but conclude that the criticism against Sen’s formulation of individual liberty
along this line has serious problems of its own, and does not succeed in presenting a mean-
ingful alternative concept of individual liberty, let alone a ‘resolution’ of the impossibility
of a Paretian liberal.
62There is another string of critics who also ﬁnd Sen’s articulation of individual liberty
in terms of decisiveness rather at odds with what an ordinary liberal would claim. To
bring his point home, recollect Sen’s motivation for his minimal liberty condition to the
following eﬀect: “If you prefer to have pink walls rather than white, then [the] society
should permit you to have this” and also that “whether you should sleep on your back
or on your belly is a matter in which the society should permit you absolute freedom”.
Not many people with liberal belief would have anything to say against Sen’s intuitive
motivation. However, the actual formulation of this intuition in terms of the relevant
person’s decisiveness in social choice may make such a person raise an eyebrow. He/she
may well ask: Why don’t we simply leave the matter of choosing the colour of one’s
bedroom walls, or choosing one’s sleeping posture, to the relevant person’s warranted
individual choice, rather than articulating such a right through his/her decisiveness in
social choice?
It was in this vein that Nozick made the following famous remark on Sen’s impossi-
bility of a Paretian liberal:
“A more appropriate view of individual rights is as follows. Individual rights
are co-possible; each person may exercise his rights as he chooses. The exercise
of these rights ﬁxes some features of the world. ::: If l have a right to choose
to live in New York or in Massachusetts, and I choose Massachusetts, then
alternatives involving my living in New York are not appropriate objects to
be entered in a social ordering (Nozick [22 p.166]).”
Capitalizing on, and generalizing Nozick’s observation, Sugden [38; 39; 40] and Gaertner,
Pattanaik and Suzumura [12] have developed an alternative approach to individual liber-
tarian rights, which came to be known as the game form approach to individual rights.12
This approach articulates individual libertarian rights as (i) the complete freedom of
each player to choose any admissible strategy, and (ii) the obligation of each player not
to choose an inadmissible strategy for himself/herself, and not to prevent anyone from
choosing an admissible strategy.
In the case of Nozick’s counterargument against Sen, for example, the game form that
captures Nozick’s right to choose to live in New York or Massachusetts can be formulated
neatly as follows: Nozick’s set of admissible strategies, say SNozick, should contain “to
live in New York” and “to live in Massachusetts”, and the set of admissible strategies for
all other persons should not contain such strategies as “to harass Nozick if he chooses to
live in Massachusetts”, “to force Nozick to live in New York at gunpoint”, and so forth,
12A game form is a speciﬁcation of a set N of players, a set Si of admissible strategies for each
player i in N, a set A of feasible outcomes, and an outcome function g which maps each strategy proﬁle
s = (s1;s2;:::;sn), where si is in Si for each i in N, into a social outcome g(s) in A. Given a game form
G = (N;fSig;g), if a proﬁle R = (R1;R2;:::;Rn) of preference orderings of the players is speciﬁed,
we have a game (G;R). G¨ ardenfors [13] developed a related but distinct game theoretic approach to
individual liberty. See also Bernholz [4], Deb [7], Gibbard [15], Hammond [17; 18], Pattanaik [23; 24],
Sen [34; 36], and Suzumura [47] for more detailed account of the alternative approaches to individual
liberty. The following exposition of the game form approach is based on Pattanaik and Suzumura [25;
26].
63and the outcome function g should be such that g(s) is a social state in which Nozick
lives in Massachusetts (resp. he lives in New York) if sNozick (viz. Nozick’s component of
s) is “to live in Massachusetts” (resp. “to live in New York”).13
Two remarks are in order at this juncture. First, unlike the ﬁrst alternative approach
based on the voluntary exchange of libertarian rights, which not only accused Sen’s
approach of being out of line with traditional liberal values, but also asserted that the
impossibility of a Paretian liberal could be resolved by appropriately reformulating what
a liberal should claim, the game form approach does not claim to be a resolvent of Sen’s
impossibility theorem. Quite to the contrary, it was conjectured that the Sen impossibility
problem “persists under virtually every plausible concept of individual right::: (Gaertner,
Pattanaik, and Suzumura [12, p. 161]).” We will have more to say on this point in the
next section.
Second, the game form articulation of individual libertarian rights based on the in-
tuitive concept of freedom of choice is not just an alternative approach to Sen’s classical
articulation of individual liberty. It is also meant to cast serious doubt on Sen’s approach.
To bring this point home, let us examine a modiﬁed version of the Lady Chatterley’s Lover
case. Suppose that both Mr. P and Mr. L own a copy of this book. Everything else
remaining the same, there exist four social states: (r;r);(r;n);(n;r) and (n;n), where
r (resp. n) stands for “to read it” (resp. “not to read it”). Suppose further that their
preference orderings over f(r;r);(r;n);(n;r);(n;n)g are described as follows:14
RP : (n;n);(r;r);(n;r);(r;n)
RL : (n;r);(r;n);(r;r);(n;n).
Following the game form approach and the intuitive concept of freedom of choice, let
us entrust each and every person to choose either to read this book or not to read it in
accordance with his individual preference. However, this is not a straightforward problem
of preference optimization. The eﬀect on a person of his choice from the set of options
fr;ng hinges squarely on what the other person chooses from the same set of optionsℤ
and no one is within his right to know the other’s choice beforehand. In this sense, the
problem of choice faced by Mr. P and Mr. L is that of choice under uncertainty. If they
follow the maximin principle of choice under uncertainty, the maximin choice of Mr. P
(resp. Mr. L) is n (resp. r), thereby generating a social state (n;r) through unhindered
exercise of their respective freedom of choice. However, since (r;r) and (n;r) diﬀer only in
Mr. P’s reading or not reading this book, and Mr. P prefers (r;r) to (n;r), the realization
of (n;r) cannot but be regarded that Mr. P’s liberty is violated if we subscribe to Sen’s
articulation of individual liberty, even though nobody’s freedom of choice is violated in
this case.
13Lest we should be misunderstood that the game form approach hinges on the supposition that each
and every person is empowered to control some aspects of socia1 states directly, let us emphasize that
no such unwarranted restriction is needed for the workability of this approach. Those who are interested
are referred to Gaertner, Pattanaik and Suzumura [12], Pattanaik [24], and Suzumura [47], where many
examples are worked out in order to illustrate and substantiate this claim.
14Preference orderings are represented horizontally, with the less preferred alternative to the right of
the more preferred alternative.
64We have thus shown that the game form articulation of individual liberty is a viable
alternative to Sen’s formulation, and it poses a serious doubt on the compatibility of
Sen’s approach with our intuition about freedom of choice. In the next section, we will
identify three crucial problems in the theory of individual rights within the conceptual
framework of game form approach.
4 Articulation, Realization, and Initial Conferment
of Rights
In discussing individual libertarian rights, three distinct issues should be addressed. The
ﬁrst issue is the formal structure of rights. The second issue is the realization of conferred
rights. The third issue is the initial conferment of rights. In the previous section, we
have contrasted Sen’s articulation of the formal structure of individual libertarian rights
and the game form articulation of rights. In Sen’s approach, the issue of the realization of
conferred rights boils down to the existence of a collective choice rule which realizes the
conferred individual decisiveness in social choice, whereas Sen never addressed himself
to the issue of the initial conferment of rights.15 The rest of this section is devoted to
explaining how the game form approach treats the second and third issues.16
The issue of the realization of conferred rights is treated by the game form approach as
follows. Let A be the set of feasible social states. Given a game form GA = (N;fSig;gA)
which articulates the conferred individual rights when A prevails, and given a proﬁle
R = (R1;R2;:::;Rn) of individual preference orderings over the set of social states, we
have a game (GA;R). Let T(GA;R) be the set of all social states which the society
predicts to appear when the game (GA;R) is played.17 It is clear that the conferred
rights GA will be realized through the play of the game (GA;R) and a social state in
T(GA;R) will materialize as a result of the play of this game.
The issue of the initial conferment of rights requires us to expand our conceptual
framework rather substantially. To ask and answer how and why a game form represent-
ing individual rights come to be conferred in the ﬁrst place, it is not enough that we are
informed of the individual preference orderings over the set of social outcomes. To bring
this point home, consider the following simple problem.
A father is to divide a cake among three children fairly. Method I is that the father
divides this cake into three equal pieces, and tells them to take a piece each or leave it.
15Since Sen’s interest was focussed on the basic conﬂict between non-welfaristic claim of rights and
welfaristic claim of Pareto optimality, it was unnecessary for him to provide a full characterization of
rights, neither was it necessary for him to develop a theory of the initial conferment of rights.
16The following analysis is essentially based on Pattanaik and Suzumura [25; 26]. Those who are
interested in some technical details are referred to these original sources.
17If the prevailing concept of equilibrium is given by E and the set BE(GA;R) of pure strategy
equilibria is non-empty, then it is natural to assume that: T(GA;R) = fx¤ 2 Ajx¤ = gA(s) for some
s 2 BE(GA;R)g. The case where there exists no pure strategy equilibrium, but a mixed strategy
equilibrium does exist, and the case where there exists no equilibrium are discussed in Pattanaik and
Suzumura [26].
65Method II is that the children are given the opportunity to discuss how this enticing cake
should be divided fairly among them, and cut it into three pieces in accordance with the
conclusion they arrive at. If they happen to conclude that equal division should be the
outcome, and if we are informed only of the outcomes, we cannot but conclude that these
two methods are the same. It is clear, however, that this is certainly inappropriate. In
the case of method I, three children are not provided with any right to participate in
the process through which their dividend is determined, whereas in the case of method
II, they are endowed with such a right. To capture this important diﬀerence, we must
enlarge the description of social state in such a way that, not only the social outcomes,
but also the process or mechanism through which such outcomes are brought about, are
included.18
This conceptual expansion can be attained as follows. Let x and y be two (conven-
tionally deﬁned) social states, and let µ and ´ be two decision-making mechanisms. The
ordered pair (x;µ) [resp. (y;´)] denotes an extended social state in which the outcome
x (resp. y) is entailed through the decision-making mechanism µ (resp. ´). It is assumed
that people are prepared to make judgements of the following type: It is better to obtain
an outcome x through a mechanism µ than to obtain an outcome y through a mechanism
´. In what follows, we focus on the situation where the decision-making mechanism is
speciﬁed by the rights-system G which speciﬁes a game form GA for each set of feasible
outcomes A. Let Q = (Q1;Q2;:::;Qn) be the proﬁle of extended individual preference
orderings over the pairs (x;G
1);(y;G
2), etc. Note in passing that, for any ﬁxed rights-
system G, the proﬁle Q induces a proﬁle QG = (Q1G;Q2G;:::;QnG) over the set of
conventionally deﬁned social states by xQiGy if and only if (x;G)Qi(y;G) for all x;y in
X and all i in N.
Suppose that a feasible set of outcomes A, rights-system G, and a proﬁle of extended
individual preference orderings Q are given. We then obtain a game (GA;QG), the play
of which will determine a set T(GA;QG) of realizable social states. For the sake of
simplicity in exposition, it is assumed in what follows that T(GA;QG) consists only of a
single element, say ¿(GA;QG).19 In this case, a feasible extended social state is given by
(¿(GA;QG);G).
We are now ready to explain how this framework treats the issue of the initial con-
ferment of rights. Let Ψ be the the extended social welfare function which maps each
proﬁle Q = (Q1;Q2;:::;Qn) of extended individual preference orderings into an ex-
tended social welfare ordering: Q = Ψ(Q). Given a set A of feasible social states, the
socially optimal conferment of rights is nothing other than the rights-system G such
that (¿(G¤
A;QG);G)Ψ(Q)(¿(GA;QG);G) holds for any feasible rights-system G.
Before closing this summary account of the game form approach to individual lib-
ertarian rights, two remarks are due. First, unlike Sen’s classical articulation of rights,
the game form articulation of rights does not assign any role whatsoever to individual
preferences. However, in the realization of rights articulated by the rights-system, as well
as in the initial conferment of rights, this theory does assign crucial role to the proﬁle of
18See Arrow [1, Chapter 7, Section 6], and Sen [37] for further forceful endorsement of this viewpoint.
19See Pattanaik and Suzumura [26] for a fuller exposition without this simplifying assumption.
66extended individual preference orderings. In the former case, it is the induced preference
proﬁle QG, together with the set A of feasible social states, which determines the game
(GA;QG) to be played as well as the outcome of the play ¿(GA;QG). In the latter case,
it is the extended social welfare ordering Q = Ψ(Q) which determines the rights-system
to be conferred. Thus, in the full theory of game form approach to rights, there are im-
portant niches for individual preference orderings. To recapitulate, although the formal
contents of the conferred game form rights are independent of individual preferences, the
extended individual preferences play a crucial role in deciding the rights-system to be
conferred, as well as in socially realizing the individual freedom of choice thus conferred.
Second, unlike in the context of the Sen-Gibbard rights, the game form approach to
rights does not have any counterpart of the Gibbard impossibility theorem. In other
words, the problem of internal inconsistency of rights never surfaces in the game form
approach. To the extent that the initial conferment of rights is performed in accordance
with the scenario of the game form approach, the conferred rights will be realized through
the actual play of the game, thereby excluding any possibility of internal inconsistency
of rights.
5 Sen’s Criticism Against Welfarism: An Evaluation
Back, then, to the central focus of this chapter. What does the game form approach
clarify about the impossibility of a Paretian liberal? Does it fortify, or qualify, or even
nullify Sen’s criticism against welfarism which is based on the basic conﬂict between the
welfaristic Pareto principle and the non-welfaristic claim of individual liberty? In what
follows, we will contend that the main thrust of Sen’s criticism against welfarism remains
intact even if Sen’s articulation of individual liberty is rejected and replaced by the game
form articulation.
To begin with, consider yet another variant of Sen’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover case. As
in the ﬁrst variant used in Section 3 to crystallize a conceptual diﬃculty of Sen’s approach,
suppose that both Mr. P and Mr. L have a copy of Lady Chatterley’s Lover, and their
preference orderings over the set of feasible social states f(r;r);(r;n);(n;r);(n;n)g are
given by:
RP : (n;n);(r;n);(n;r);(r;r)
RL : (r;r);(r;n);(n;r);(n;n).
As in the ﬁrst variant, the issue of individual liberty contained in this situation may
be captured neatly by the game form G = (N;fn;rg;fn;rg;g), where N = fP;Lg and
the outcome function g is such that g(sP;sL) = (sP;sL), where sP and sL are taken
from fn;rg. Unlike in the ﬁrst variant, however, the preference proﬁle R = (RP;RL)
that deﬁnes a game (G;R) has a dominant strategy equilibrium (n;r), which is Pareto
dominated by (r;n). Thus, the voluntary exercise of freedom of choice yields a social state
which is Pareto dominated by another feasible social state. This is the ﬁrst instance in
which Sen’s impossibility of a Paretian liberal recurs in the context of realizing conferred
game form rights.
67As a matter of fact, Sen’s impossibility recurs also in the context of initial conferment
of game form rights. To show this possibility unambiguously, consider a situation where
N = fC;Dg (C = “consequentialist”; D = “deontologist”). There are two issues to be
decided on. The ﬁrst issue is the religion, and there are two options: b =“Buddhism” and
c = “Christianity”. The second issue is whether or not a book is to be read, and there
are two options: r = “to read it” and n = “not to read it”. Thus, the set A of physically
possible social states consists of 16 alternatives. A typical element of A is denoted by
(c;n;b;r), which is a state where Mr. C believes in Christianity and does not read the
book, and Mr. D believes in Buddhism and reads the book. There are two feasible rights-
systems: G1 = fG1g and G2 = fG2g.20 The game form G1 = (N;fS1
i g;g1), where S1
i is
the Cartesian product of fb;cg and fr;ng for i = C;D and g1(s) = s for all s = (s1;s2)
such that si is in S1
i for i = C;D, is the one where the two persons are empowered to
choose their religion as well as reading or not reading the book freely. In contrast, the
game form G2 = (N;fS2
i g;g2), where S2
i = fr;ng for i = C;D and g2(s) = s for all
s = (s1;s2) such that si is in S2
i for i = C;D is the one where the two persons are only
allowed to choose reading or not reading the book freely, the matter of choosing common
religion being decided by the society. If the social choice of common religion is t in fb;cg
and the strategy pair s is chosen, then the social state will be given by (t;s1;t;s2).
Let Q = (QC;QD) be the proﬁle of extended individual preference orderings. Mr. C
is a die hard consequentialist who cares only about the outcomes of social interactions
and nothing else. Thus, for all social state x in A;(x;G1)I(QC)(x;G2) holds true, where
I(QC) is the indiﬀerence relation generated by QC. For each pair (u;v), where u (resp.
v) refers to Mr. C’s (resp. Mr. D’s) religion, and for each G = G1 and G2, let QCG(u;v)
be deﬁned by:
QCG(u;v) : (u;r;v;r);(u;n;v;r);(u;r;v;n);(u;n;v;n),
which, in turn, is used to deﬁne QCG by:
QCG : QCG(b;c);QCG(b;b);QCG(c;b);QCG(c;c).
Mr. D is a deontologist whose belief in the procedural justice in allowing people to
choose their religion has such predominant importance that, for all x;y in A, he holds
that (x;G1)P(QD)(y;G2). For each pair (u;v) of religions of Mr. C and Mr. D and for
each G = G1 and G2, we deﬁne QDG(u;v) by:
QDG(u;v) : (u;n;v;n);(u;n;v;r);(u;r;v;n);(u;r;v;r),
which, in turn, is used to deﬁne QDG by:
QDG : QDG(c;c);QDG(b;c);QDG(c;b);QDG(b;b).
Let us examine the game (G1;QG1). It is easy, if tedious, to check that (b;r) is
the dominant strategy for Mr. C, and (c;n) is the dominant strategy for Mr. D. Thus,
20Throughout this example, the feasible set A is ﬁxed, which is why G1 as well as G2 consists of only
one game form each.
68(b;r;c;n) in A is the dominant strategy equilibrium in the game (G1;QG1). In the
situation where there exists a dominant strategy equilibrium, it is very natural to assume
that ¿(G1;QG1) = ((b;r;c;n);G1). Turning to the game (G2;QG2), it is again easy to
conﬁrm that r (resp. n) is the dominant strategy for Mr. C (resp. Mr. D) irrespective
of whether the social choice of religion turns out to be b or c. Thus, ¿(G2;QG2) =
((b;r;b;n);G2) or ((c;r;c;n);G2) depending on the social choice of b or c. Recollect that
Mr. D holds a lexicographic preference for (x;G1) against (y;G2) whatever may be x and
y. Thus, he must surely prefer ¿(G1;QG1) to ¿(G2;QG2). Mr. C being a consequentialist,
he is indiﬀerent between ¿(G1;QG1) = ((b;r;c;n);G1) and ((b;r;c;n);G2) and he prefers
((b;r;c;n);G2) to ((b;r;b;n);G2) as well as to ((c;r;c;n);G2). By transitivity of QC,
Mr. C must then prefer ¿(G1;QG1) to ¿(G2;QG2). Thus, as long as the extended social
welfare function Ψ satisﬁes the Pareto principle, G1 must be the rights-system to be
conferred. However, if G1 is conferred and the game (G1;QG1) is played, (b;r;c;n)
will be the social outcome, which is Pareto dominated by another feasible social state
(b;n;c;r).
We have thus shown that Sen’s Pareto libertarian paradox recurs not only in the
context of realizing game form rights, but also in the context of initial conferment of
game form rights. It is in this sense that we contend that Sen’s criticism against welfarism
survives without losing an iota of its importance even if his articulation of libertarian
rights has to be replaced by the allegedly more proper game form articulation. We close
this section by re-stating our conviction that the Sen impossibility problem “persists
under virtually every plausible concept of individual rights”.
6 Concluding Remarks
To argue for the logical relevance of Sen’s criticism against welfarism is one thingℤand
to argue for its empirical relevance in the actual context where welfare economics is set
in motion is quite another. In this chapterℤwe have conﬁrmed that Sen’s impossibility
of a Paretian liberal does not lose its logical relevance even in the light of the many
criticisms recently raised against Sen’s method of articulating individual liberty in terms
of a person’s decisive power in social choice. How about the empirical relevance? Is
Sen’s impossibility just a theoretical curiosity which is amusing as a logical exercise in
the classroom yet can be safely neglected once we turn our attention to the pressing
economic problems where the real bite of welfare economics is seriously tested? Quite
to the contrary, it seems to us that there are many real situations where serious conﬂict
occurs between the claim of individual rights and the desire for social eﬃciency.
Suﬃce it to visualize a local city where small and traditional retailers are engaging in
hand-to-mouth business. From the viewpoint of improving social eﬃciency in retailing
service in this city, it makes sense to allow a few large-scale organized retailers to enter
this city. If we do so, however, those small retailers who have been doing business in this
city over many years will almost surely be unable to cope with the large-scale retailers and
expelled from retailing business. Should we pursue the improvement in social eﬃciency
at the cost of depriving small retailers of their “rights” of doing business? Or, should we
69respect these “rights” at the cost of missing an opportunity to improve social eﬃciency
in retailing business? This is a typical and realistic situation where policy makers are
confronted with the conﬂict between right and eﬃciency.
To the extent that welfare economics claims to serve as the theoretical foundations
of economic policy, there is no way of avoiding such conﬂict between two basic values
— the welfaristic value of social eﬃciency, on the one hand, and the non-welfaristic
claim of individual rights, on the other. Although Sen [29] posed this serious problem
in terms of a deceptively simple parable, the problem he thereby posed is neither simple
nor unrealistic.
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